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INTRODUCTION 
Symposiums supply a snapshot in time. By observing the common 
assumptions and shared frameworks of a collection of scholars, writing 
contemporaneously, one gains both insight into the intellectual world of a past era 
and the ability to measure its distance from our own. Twenty five years ago the 
Virginia Law Review organized a noted symposium to celebrate the 50th 
Anniversary of the SEC (the “1984 Symposium”).1 A number of prominent 
scholars participated,2 and its articles have been much cited.  
Now, we are at it again. Unlike then, however, there is a difference in the 
mood. The natural superiority of the U.S. model for securities regulation is no 
                                                 
* Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law and F. Arnold Daum Chair in Corporate Finance and 
Law respectively.  The authors wish to thank participants at the Virginia Symposium as well as Jill 
Fisch and Steve Wallman for their comments.  For research assistance, thanks goes to Paul 
Justensen and Tyler Leavengood. 
1 See “Fifty Years of Securities Regulation:  Symposium on Contemporary Problems in 
Securities Regulation,” 70 Va. L. Rev. 545-873 (1984). The Virginia Law Review earlier 
memorialized the SEC’s “silver” anniversary in 1959. See Louis Loss, Contemporary Problems in 
Securities Regulation, 45 Va. L. Rev. 787 (1959) and accompanying articles. Id. at 787-1072. 
2 In alphabetical order, the participants included Professor Allison Gray Anderson, John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Frank H. Easterbrook, Daniel R. Fischel, Ronald J. Gilson, Edmund W. Kitch, 
Reinier H. Kraackman, Saul Levmore and Walter Werner. SEC Chairman John Shad provided the 
Introduction, and Donald L. Calvin of the New York Stock Exchange also participated. 
2 Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea? 
longer an article of faith. Rather, much of the world believes they have been 
caught in a financial crisis because of an illness that began in the U.S. housing 
market but that has been exported to the rest of the world by U.S.-based financial 
intermediaries. This article will move from an examination of the SEC’s 
responsibility for that crisis to a discussion of how financial regulation should be 
structured for the future. 
A quarter century ago, the outlook was more optimistic. The market 
seemed self-correcting, and the need for regulation was perceived as at most 
modest. Revealingly, in the 1984 Symposium, little, if anything, was said about 
globalization or technology (indeed, the Internet was not then known), but these 
proved to be among the most dynamic and destabilizing forces that have shaped 
the intervening era. Nor was much attention given to comparative law. The U.S. 
system of securities regulation was implicitly assumed to be the template for the 
rest of the world to emulate. Finally, securities regulation was not viewed as part 
of a broader system of financial regulation, but as an alternative means of 
influencing corporate governance. Federalism – i.e., the allocation of power 
between state and federal regulators – received much attention,3 but not the 
parallel allocation of authority among federal financial regulators. No one asked:  
why is it that the SEC is an independent agency and not an arm of the Treasury 
Department or the Federal Reserve? Today, these ignored issues – globalization, 
technology, comparative institutional structure, and the place of securities 
regulation within financial regulation generally – dominate the current discussion. 
What did receive primary attention back then? Above all, the 1984 
symposium demonstrated the new ascendancy of finance theory. The Efficient 
Capital Market Hypothesis (“ECMH”) was at stage center and the zenith of its 
acceptance, with a number of authors arguing that it implied that law should play 
only a secondary and severely constrained role. Others explained that markets 
worked, less because of law or the threat of liability, but rather because 
information was produced, collected, verified and disseminated by “reputational 
intermediaries” – investment banks, auditors, securities analysts, and credit rating 
agencies – who pledged their reputational capital behind their opinions and 
judgments.4 Hence, these intermediaries would have little incentive to 
misrepresent or distort.5 For most participants in the 1984 Symposium, 
deregulation was the appropriate response to this “modern” recognition of the 
                                                 
3 Professors Anderson and Kitch expressly debated the implications of Federalism for the 
SEC’s authority. Compare Alison Gray Anderson, The Meaning of Federalism:  Interpreting the 
Securities Exchange of 1934, 70 Va. L. Rev. 813 (1984) with Edmund W. Kitch, A Federal Vision 
of the Securities Laws, 70 Va. L. Rev. 857 (1984). Federalism is, of course, the opium of the law 
professors, which they can rarely avoid, even if there is nothing new to be said. 
4 Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. 
L. Rev. 549, 604-05, 619-21 (1984). 
5 Thus, a few years later, Judge Frank Easterbrook, a participant in the 1984 Symposium, 
declared in an opinion that, because auditors would lose more in reputational capital than they 
could gain in audit fees from a dishonest client, it would be “irrational for any of them to have 
joined cause with” such a client. See DiLeo v. Ernst & Young 901 F. 2d 624 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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market’s efficiency, and, not surprisingly, a major shift towards deregulation was 
then very much in progress. 
So how much distance separates then from now? Today, the bloom is 
clearly off the rose of finance theory. Intellectual paradigms have shifted over the 
interim, as a new generation of “behavioral economists” have come to view the 
ECMH more skeptically, emphasizing in particular the limits of arbitrage.6 
Deregulation is no longer the presumptive policy prescription; indeed today, the 
sense is growing that the current crisis may have been deepened by excessive 
deregulation, which a process of international regulatory arbitrage arguably 
enforced.7 Similarly, the naiveté behind the view that markets are always quickly 
self-correcting because of the efforts of reputational intermediaries now seems 
apparent.8 “Reputational intermediaries” proved to have their own biases and to 
be highly vulnerable to issuer pressure. Yet, they remain indispensible because 
there are simply a number of contexts where investors cannot themselves 
undertake the verification and evaluative tasks that these experts perform.  
Today, we term these specialized intermediaries “gatekeepers,”9 and their 
repeated failure has dominated public attention. In 2002, Congress responded to 
the conflicts surrounding auditors by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, largely to 
replace private self-regulation of the auditing profession with public regulation.10 
Also in that year, the major investment banks entered into a Global Settlement 
                                                 
6 For leading works in this field, all raising challenges to the ECMH, see generally 
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler, ed., 1993); Robert J. Shiller, 
MARKET VOLATILITY (1991); Andrei Shleifer, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: An Introduction 
to Behavioral Finance 10-23 (2000). Of course, many scholars continue to defend the ECMH. See 
Paul G. Mahoney, Is There A Cure for “Excessive Trading”?, 81 Va. L. Rev. 713, 718-21 (1995). 
7 A vigorous debate is in progress over whether firms and financial institutions are 
migrating away from U.S. markets to less regulated foreign markets (most notably London). 
Compare Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi, & Rene M. Stulz, “Has New York Become Less 
Competitive in Global Markets? Evaluating Foreign Listing Choices Over Time (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 13079) (2007) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=982193) 
(finding New York has held at least even with London as a venue for foreign listings) with Comm. 
On Capital Mkts. Regulation, Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation at 
2-6 (2006) (finding U.S. has suffered a decline in competitiveness). Regardless of the empirically 
correct answer to this question of decline, U.S. policy makers have been bombarded since the 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 with advice and predictions that stricter regulation will 
entail a flight by regulated entities to less demanding markets (with London being the usual 
asserted beneficiary of this flight). 
8 Indeed, Professors Gilson and Kraakman, writing in 2003, have conceded their 
“naiveté” on this point. See Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, Symposium:  Revisiting the 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency:  The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later:  
The Hindsight Bias, 28 Iowa J. Corp. L 715, 736-37 (2003). 
9 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., GATEKEEPERS:  The Professions and Corporate 
Governance (Oxford University Press 2006). 
10  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101, 116 Stat 745 (2002) 
(creating the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), a non-profit corporation 
whose board is accountable to the SEC for adopting and enforcing regulations of public 
accountants). 
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with the New York State Attorney General, the SEC, and other securities 
regulators, adopting prophylactic reforms and Chinese Walls to protect the 
integrity of another gatekeeper, the securities analyst.11 More recently, the 
subprime mortgage debacle has amply demonstrated the failure of still another 
gatekeeper: the credit rating agency.12 If there is a common theme linking these 
events, it is probably that self-regulation has severe limitations and seems to work 
best only when the self-regulator’s duties are clearly demarcated (and it enforces 
what this article will term “rules” rather than “principles.”)  
Viewed panoramically, the most obvious developments over the interval 
since 1984 have probably been the rapid succession of market crashes and 
scandals. These seem disproportionate in both frequency and severity to prior 
periods in U.S. financial history. To be sure, the market crash in 1987 now seems 
an isolated event that proved little (other than that the unexpected can happen). 
But repeated waves of scandals have followed: the 2000 Dot.Com crash, the 
2001-2002 accounting irregularity scandals that culminated in the bankruptcy of 
Enron and WorldCom, the New York Attorney General-led investigation of 
securities analyst conflicts of interest that resulted in a global settlement in 2003, 
the 2003-2004 “market timing” scandal involving mutual funds, the stock option 
backdating investigation that began in 2006, and lastly and, most importantly, the 
current financial crisis that first surfaced in the U.S. housing market in 2007, then 
spread to derivatives, and has now paralyzed most major financial institutions. All 
came in rapid succession, revealed pervasive misconduct by “reputational 
intermediaries,” and have shaken market confidence. If once the rest of the world 
looked to the SEC for leadership on issues of securities regulation, that presumed 
leadership is in question today.  
A related consequence of these scandals has been that a new layer of 
financial regulation has developed over the last decade in the United States:  state 
regulators now have become important players in major financial scandals. While 
state regulators were important prior to the enactment of the federal securities 
laws, they had become peripheral players by 2000.13 Their resurgence may have 
                                                 
11   COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 9, at 265–66. New York’s Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer discovered widespread abuse of investment bank research analysts’ power.  In exchange 
for more business, these research analysts manipulated their findings to produce favorable ratings 
for their investment bank clients.  Spitzer and his staff discovered internal emails written by 
research analysts at Merrill Lynch that exposed the fraud.  In April 2002, Spitzer settled with 
Merrill Lynch for $100 million.  Soon thereafter, the SEC, NYSE, and NASD investigated other 
large investment banks and found similar fraud.  In April 2003, Spitzer settled with 10 major 
underwriting firms for $1.3875 billion.  Id.  See also, Hillary A. Sale, Banks:  The Forgotten (?) 
Partners in Fraud, 73 Cin. L. Rev. 139 (2004) (discussing Spitzer’s role in uncovering the 
investment banking issues and analyzing the resulting settlements). 
12 For a discussion of credit rating agencies as gatekeepers and why they failed, see 
Coffee, supra note 9, at 34, 283-98. 
13  See Howard M. Friedman, The Impact of NSMIA on State Regulation of Broker-
Dealers and Investment Advisers, 53 Bus. Law. 511 (1997).  The National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act (NSMIA) significantly impacted the role of federal and state regulators and 
enforcers in dealing with securities offerings and professionals.  Id. at 511.  The NSMIA pre-
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begun with Eliot Spitzer, but it shows no signs of ending with his political demise. 
Not surprisingly, the financial industry has not welcomed this new activism by 
State Attorney Generals and would be happy to constrain or preempt them. 
Reorganization of financial regulation could provide political cover for legislation 
curbing the reach of state regulators.14 But the broader policy question first needs 
to be addressed:  To what extent is competition among regulators desirable? 
This question inevitably leads to another:  what responsibility does the 
SEC bear for this succession of scandals and bubbles? Did the SEC and Congress 
move too sweepingly in dismantling investor protections? Each episode is 
different, and little consensus is likely, but one common denominator may link 
them:  the impact of rapid financial deregulation. This wave of deregulation began 
with the SEC’s adoption of shelf registration in 1982 and continued with the 
passage of a series of statutes – the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 
1995, the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, the Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998. In the background, the gradual de 
facto repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act throughout the 1990s, culminating in the 
passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (“GLBA”), also contributed. 
Today, this trend toward deregulation has slowed or halted, and the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in 2002 and the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 certainly 
show that Congress will again turn to regulatory solutions, particularly when 
concerned about the conduct of gatekeepers. 
Were there regulatory failures over this time period? Or would any system 
that stifled the “animal spirits” of the market have involved greater cost? Again, 
sharp disagreements are inevitable because attitudes toward regulation have 
polarized since 1984. Until the current crisis struck, critics of regulation had been 
arguing that the U.S. was losing its capital market competitiveness because it was 
taking a more aggressive posture towards regulation, and particularly towards 
enforcement, compared to the other major capital markets.15 At one pole in this 
debate, some academics even urged that issuers should be able to choose both the 
corporate and securities law applicable to them, opting from an inventory that 
                                                                                                                                     
empted many state regulations and transferred many enforcement responsibilities from the states 
to the federal government.  In states that have not adopted regulations to mirror the NSMIA, for 
example, state enforcers cannot take any action to prosecute offenders.  Instead, they must wait for 
the SEC or one of the SROs to step in.  Id. at 522–23; see also G. Phillip Rutledge, NSMIA…One 
Year Later: The States’ Response, 53 Bus. Law. 563, 570–74 (1997) (discussing the NSMIA’s 
impact on states and how states are responding to the new shift in regulatory authority). 
14 There are proposals to this effect in the U.S. Treasury Department’s recent “Blueprint.” 
See The Department of Treasury, Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure 
(2008) at 20 and 172 [hereinafter Treasury Report]. 
15 See Comm. On Capital Markets Regulation, Interim Report of the Committee on 
Capital Markets Regulation (2006). Popularly known at the “Paulson Report,” this document does 
conclude that the United States’s more stringent regulatory policies have injured its international 
competitiveness. Id. at 2-6. 
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would include at the least the corporate and securities laws of the major markets.16 
Such choice, it was argued, would drive a process of regulatory arbitrage until, in 
theory, the optimal level of regulation was reached. The current crisis is likely to 
mute this demand for investor choice, because in a world of collapsing and 
insolvent financial institutions, few favor giving them the right to choose their 
level of supervision, and regulatory arbitrage inherently reduces the intensity of 
regulatory oversight. The first lesson of the current crisis is that externalities 
result when a financial institution fails; hence, shareholders cannot be given 
unconstrained choice. In turn, a precondition of international competitiveness is 
that a country’s financial institutions be able to survive a crisis. Conversely, the 
current crisis also challenges those who favor stronger regulation and 
enforcement. Why did the crisis begin, and largely devastate the financial 
landscape, in the United States, which has long had much more aggressive public 
and private enforcement? If enforcement works, the U.S. should seemingly have 
been spared. 
Both those who favor and those who oppose increased financial regulation 
can agree on one thing:  the current organization of financial regulation in the 
United States is inefficient or worse. Almost no one likes the status quo. The level 
of dissatisfaction with the current regulatory model was clearly evidenced by the 
response to the recent report of the Treasury Department, entitled “Blueprint for a 
Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure” (the “Blueprint”).17 The Blueprint 
recommended both (1) a fundamental reorganization and consolidation of all 
financial regulators in the United States, and (2) a major shift towards a more 
deregulatory style that emphasizes reliance on “principles” (rather than “rules”) 
and self-regulation by the industry. Much like a Rohrsach test, the Blueprint 
predictably drew mixed and revealing reactions. Few endorsed its specific 
recommendations; some feared that its proposed reallocation implied the demise 
of the SEC,18 but most agreed that it would and should trigger a necessary debate 
over structural reform. This article analyzes the Blueprint’s proposals, but in 
terms of its own very different assessment of where financial regulation has gone 
awry. 
The consensus today is that the U.S. has a highly fragmented and arguably 
Balkanized structure of financial regulation, which approaches creating a different 
regulator for every class of financial institution. But what feasible alternatives 
exist? Part I of this article surveys the different patterns of financial regulation 
                                                 
16 See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 2359 (1998). To be sure, Professor Romano does not expressly discuss 
the special case of financial institutions, but her prescription of investor choice is unqualified, and 
choice as to disclosure rules is not fundamentally different from choice as to other regulatory 
regimes. 
17 See The Department of the Treasury, supra note 14. 
18 For such a view, see Julie Satow, “Will Bernanke Doom the SEC?,” New York Sun, 
July 11, 2008 at p. 1 (expressing view that Federal Reserve oversight of investment banks would 
eclipse the SEC). 
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that have recently emerged in the other major capital markets and the failures that 
sparked these recent changes. Part II will then return to the U.S. and ask a simple 
but unavoidable question:  why have there been so many recent scandals? What 
failures do they suggest within the U.S. regulatory system? This discussion sets 
the stage for an examination of the major proposals in the Treasury Department’s 
Blueprint. Part III will specifically focus on the Blueprint’s proposal that U.S. 
financial regulation should move to a more “principles-based” system and away 
from its alleged current fixation on rules. Part IV will similarly examine the 
Blueprint’s contention that U.S. financial regulation should rely to a greater extent 
on self-regulation by private bodies, such as stock exchanges, which would adopt 
rules from broad generic principles promulgated by the securities regulator. 
Uniting the Blueprint’s separate strands is a common underlying theme:  
to maintain U.S. capital market competitiveness, the U.S. should relax its 
traditionally aggressive enforcement policies, either by relying more on broad 
principles and self-regulation by the industry, or by delegating at least some 
aspects of oversight and enforcement to industry self-regulation. This article 
rejects this argument as unpersuasive and highly ideological; indeed, it views such 
an attitude as a cause of the current crisis. 
Nevertheless, this article concludes that the Blueprint is correct on a 
critical point: regulatory consolidation is necessary. Unfortunately, progress on 
that score may be slow. After all, it took over twenty years for Congress to 
dismantle the Glass-Steagall Act, even though, over much of that period, the 
Act’s obsolescence (and eventually its irrelevance) was apparent to most. The 
Blueprint’s call for a re-allocation and consolidation of regulatory responsibilities 
does make sense, even if implementation of any reforms will be slow. The 
immediate focus should be on the SEC, itself:  what does it do well – and less 
well? Based on this evaluation, we will conclude with suggestions for a re-
allocation of authority between the SEC and other financial regulators that moves 
the “prudential” supervision of the “safety and soundness” of investment banks to 
banking regulators, but maintains and consolidates within the SEC authority for 
consumer protection and oversight of business practices. 
Part I:  Regulatory Modernization:  A Brief Tour of Recent Developments 
Organizationally, financial regulation in the major capital markets today 
follows one of three basic models: 
A. The Functional/Institutional Model 
The Blueprint repeatedly refers to the United States as having a “current 
system of functional regulation, which maintains separate regulatory agencies 
across segregated functional lines of financial services, such as banking, 
8 Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea? 
insurance, securities and futures.”19 This is at best a partial truth. In fact, the U.S. 
falls considerably short of even a “functional” regulatory model. By design, 
“functional” regulation seeks to subject similar activities to regulation by the 
same regulator. Its premise is that no one regulator can have, or easily develop, 
expertise in regulating all aspects of financial services. Thus, the securities 
regulator understands securities, while the insurance regulator has expertise with 
respect to the very different world of insurance. In the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
of 1999 (“GLBA”), which essentially repealed the Glass-Steagall Act, Congress 
endorsed a system of functional regulation in more or less these words.20 
Nonetheless, the reality is that the United States actually has a hybrid 
system of functional and institutional regulation.21 The latter approach looks not 
to functional activity, but to institutional type. Institutional regulation is seldom 
the product of deliberate design, but rather of historical contingency, piecemeal 
reform, and gradual evolution. 
To illustrate this difference between functional and institutional 
regulation, let us hypothesize that, under a truly functional system, the securities 
regulator would have jurisdiction over all sales of securities, regardless of the type 
of institution selling the security. Conversely, let us assume that under an 
institutional system, jurisdiction over sales would be allocated according to the 
type of institution doing the selling. Against that backdrop, what do we observe 
today about the allocation of jurisdiction? Symptomatically, under a key 
compromise in GLBA, the SEC did not receive authority to oversee or enforce the 
securities laws with respect to the sale of government securities by a bank.22 
Instead, banking regulators retained that authority. Similarly, the definitions of 
“broker” and “dealer” in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were carefully 
crafted by GLBA to leave significant bank securities activities under the oversight 
of bank regulators and not the SEC.23 Predictably, even in the relatively brief time 
since the passage of GLBA in 1999, the SEC and bank regulators have engaged in 
                                                 
19 Blueprint at 4 and 27. 
20 The Conference Report to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act clearly states this:   
“Both House and Senate Bills generally adhere to the principle of 
functional regulation, which holds that similar activities should be regulated by 
the same regulator. Different regulators have expertise at supervising different 
activities. It is inefficient and impractical to expect a regulator to have or 
develop expertise in regulating all aspects of financial services.” See H.R. Rep. 
No. 106-434, at 157 (1999). 
21 For this same assessment, see Heidi Mandanis Schooner and Michael Tayler, United 
Kingdom and States Responses to the Regulatory Challenges of Modern Financial Markets, 38 
Tex. Int’l L. J. 317, 328 (2003). 
22 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. Section 78(c)(a)(34)(G), and 15 U.S.C. 
Section 78o-5(g)(2). 
23 See 15 U.S.C. Section 78(c)(a)(4) and (5). 
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a continuing turf war over the scope of the exemptions accorded to banks from the 
definition of “broker” and “dealer.”24 
None of this should be surprising. The status quo is hard to change, and 
regulatory bodies do not surrender jurisdiction easily. As a result, the regulatory 
body historically established to regulate banks will predictably succeed in 
retaining much of its authority over banks, even when banks are engaged in 
securities activities that from a functional perspective should belong to the 
securities regulator. 
“True” functional regulation would also assign similar activities to one 
regulator, rather than divide them between regulators based on only nominal 
differences in the description of the product or the legal status of the institution. 
Yet, in the case of banking regulation, three different federal regulators oversee 
banks:  national banks are supervised by the Office of the Controller of the 
Currency (“OCC”); state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve 
System are overseen by the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”) and state-chartered 
banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System but are federally 
insured are supervised by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”).25 
Balkanization does not stop there. The line between “banks,” with their three 
different regulators at the federal level, and “thrifts,” which the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (“OTS”) regulates, is again more formalistic than functional and 
reflects a political compromise more than a difference in activities.  
Turning to securities regulation, one encounters an even more unique 
anomaly:  the United States has one agency (the SEC) to regulate securities and 
another (the Commodities Future Trading Commission) to regulate futures. The 
world of derivatives is thus divided between the two, with the SEC having 
jurisdiction over options, while still a third category of derivatives – swaps – was 
placed by Congress in 2000 largely beyond the reach of both agencies. No other 
nation does anything like this. Finally, some major areas (for example, insurance) 
simply have no federal regulator. By any standard, the United States thus falls 
well short of a system of functional regulation. 
Sensibly, the Blueprint proposes to rationalize this crazy-quilt structure of 
fragmented authority through merger and consolidation of agencies. Specifically, 
it proposes both a merger of the SEC and CFTC and a merger of the OCC and the 
OTS. Alas, such mergers are rarely politically feasible, and to date, no 
commentator (to our knowledge) has predicted that these proposed mergers will 
occur. 
                                                 
24 See Kathleen Day, “Regulators Battle Over Banks:  Three Agencies Say SEC Rules 
Overstep Securities-Trading Law,” Wash. Post, July 3, 2001, at E3. Eventually, the SEC backed 
down in this particular skirmish and modified its original position. See Securities Exch. Act 
Release No. 34-44570 (July 18, 2001). 
25 This is all well described in the Blueprint. See Blueprint at 31-41. 
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Thus, although the Blueprint proposes that we move beyond functional 
regulation, the reality is that we are not even there yet, as our existing financial 
regulatory structure is organized at least as much by institutional category as by 
functional activity. Disdaining a merely “functional” reorganization under which 
banking, insurance, and securities would each be governed by their own regulator, 
the Blueprint instead envisions a far more comprehensive consolidation of all 
these specialized regulators. Why? In its view, the problems with functional 
regulation are considerable: 
“A functional approach to regulation exhibits several inadequacies, 
the most significant being the fact that no single regulator 
possesses all the information and authority necessary to monitor 
systemic risk, or the potential that events associated with financial 
institutions may trigger broad dislocation or a series of defaults 
that affect the financial system so significantly that the real 
economy is adversely affected.”26 
But beyond these concerns about systemic risk, the Blueprint has a deeper 
anxiety:  regulatory reform is necessary to maintain the capital market 
competitiveness of the United States.27 In short, the Blueprint is designed around 
two objectives:  (1) the need to better address systemic risk and the possibility of 
a cascading series of defaults, and (2) the need to enhance capital market 
competitiveness. As discussed later, the first concern is legitimate, but the second 
involves a more dubious logic. 
B. The Consolidated Financial Services Regulator 
A clear trend is today evident towards the unification of supervisory 
responsibilities for the regulation of banks, securities markets and insurance.28 
Beginning in Scandinavia in the late 1980s,29 this trend has recently led the 
United Kingdom, Japan, Korea, Germany and much of Eastern Europe to move to 
a single regulator model.30 Although there are now a number of precedents, the 
                                                 
26 Blueprint at 4. 
27 In particular, the Blueprint hypothesizes that the U.K. has enhanced its own 
competitiveness by regulatory reforms, adopted in 2000, that are principled-based and rely on self 
regulation for their implementation. Id. at 3. 
28 For recent overviews, see Ellis Ferran, Symposium:  Do Financial Supermarkets Need 
Super-Regulators? Examining the United Kingdom’s Experience in Adopting the Single Financial 
Regulator Model, 28 Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 257 (2003); Jerry W. Markham, A Comparative Analysis 
of Consolidated and Functional Regulation:  Super Regulator:  A Comparative Analysis of 
Securities and Derivative Regulation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 
Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 319 (2003); Giorgio Di Giorgio & Carmine D. Noia, Financial Market 
Regulation and Supervision:  How Many Peaks for the Euro Area?, 28 Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 463 
(2003). 
29 Norway moved to an integrated regulatory agency in 1986, followed by Denmark in 
1988, and Sweden in 1991. See D. Giorgio & D. Noia, supra note 28, at 469-478. 
30 See Bryan D. Stirewalt & Gary A. Gegenheimer, Consolidated Supervision of Banking 
Groups in the Former Soviet Republics:  A Comparative Examination of the Emerging Trend in 
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U.K. experience stands out. It was the first major international market center to 
move to a unified regulator model,31 and the Financial Services and Markets Act, 
adopted in 2000, went significantly beyond earlier precedents towards a “nearly 
universal regulator.”32 The Blueprint focuses on the U.K.’s experience because it 
believes that the U.K.’s adoption of a consolidated regulatory structure “enhanced 
the competitiveness of the U.K. economy.”33 
Do the U.K.’s recent reforms provide a legitimate prototype for the 
Blueprint’s proposals? Here, the Blueprint may have doctored its history. By most 
accounts, the U.K.’s adoption of a single regulator model was “driven by country-
specific factors,”34 including the dismal failure of a prior regulatory system that 
relied heavily on self-regulatory bodies but became a political liability because of 
its inability to cope with a succession of serious scandals. Ironically, the financial 
history of the U.K. in the 1990s has many parallels with the last decade of the 
U.S.’s experience. On the banking side, the U.K. experienced two major banking 
failures – the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (“BCCI”) in 1991 and 
Barings in 1995. Each prompted an official inquiry that found lax supervision was 
at least a partial cause.35  
Securities regulation in the U.K. came under even sharper criticism during 
the 1990s because of a series of financial scandals that were generally attributed 
to an “excessively fragmented regulatory infrastructure.”36 Under the then 
applicable law (the Financial Services Act of 1986), most regulatory powers were 
delegated to the Securities and Investments Board (“SIB”), which was a private 
body financed through a levy on market participants. However, the SIB did not 
itself directly regulate. Rather, it “set the overall framework of regulation,” but 
delegated actual authority to second tier regulators, which consisted primarily of 
self-regulatory organizations (or “SROs”).37 Persistent criticism focused on the 
inability or unwillingness of these SROs to protect consumers from fraud and 
misconduct.38 Ultimately, the then chairman of the SIB, the most important of the 
                                                                                                                                     
Emerging Markets, 23 Ann. Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 533 (2004). As discussed later, in some 
countries (most notably Japan), the change seems more one of form than of substance, with little 
in fact changing. See Markham, supra note 28, at 383-393 and 396.  
31 See Ferran, supra note, at 258. 
32 See Schooner and Taylor, supra note 21, at 329. Schooner and Taylor also observe that 
the precursors to the U.K.’s centralized regulator, which were mainly in Scandinavia, had a 
“predominantly prudential focus.” Id. at 331. That is, the unified new regulator was more a 
guardian of “safety and soundness” and less oriented toward consumer protection. 
33 Blueprint at 3. 
34 Ferran, supra note 28, at 259. 
35 Id. at 261-262. 
36 Id. at 265. 
37 Id. at 266. The most important of these were the Securities and Futures Authority 
(“SFA”), the Investment Managers’ Regulatory Organization (“IMRO”), and the Personal 
Investment Authority (“PIA”).  
38 Two scandals in particular stood out:  the Robert Maxwell affair in which a prominent 
financier effectively embezzled the pension funds of his companies and a “pension mis-selling” 
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SROs, acknowledged that self-regulation had failed in the U.K. and seemed 
unable to restore investor confidence.39 This acknowledgement set the stage for 
reform, and when a new Labour Government came into power at the end of the 
decade, one of its first major legislative acts (as it had promised in its election 
campaign) was to dismantle the former structure of SROs and replace it with a 
new and more powerful body, the Financial Services Authority (“FSA”). 
Despite the Blueprint’s enthusiasm for the U.K.’s model, the structure that 
the Blueprint proposes for the U.S. more resembles the former U.K. system than 
the current one. Under the Blueprint’s proposals, the securities regulator would be 
restricted to adopting general “principles-based” policies, which would be 
implemented and enforced by SROs.40 Arguably, the Blueprint envisions more or 
less the model that failed in the U.K. 
C. The “Twin Peaks” Model 
As the Blueprint recognizes, not all recent reforms have followed the U.K. 
model of a universal regulator. Some nations – most notably Australia and the 
Netherlands – have instead followed a “Twin Peaks” model that places 
responsibility for the “prudential regulation of relevant financial institutions” in 
one agency and supervision of “business conduct and consumer protection” in 
another.41 The term “twin peaks” derives from the work of Michael Taylor, a 
British academic and former Bank of England official. In 1995, just before 
regulatory reform became a hot political issue in the U.K., he argued that financial 
regulation had two separate basic aims (or “twin peaks”):  (1) “to ensure the 
soundness of the financial system,” and (2) “to protect consumers from 
unscrupulous operators.”42 Taylor’s work was original less in its proposal to 
separate “prudential” regulation from “business conduct” regulation than in its 
insistence upon the need to consolidate responsibility for the financial soundness 
of all major financial institutions in a single agency.43 Taylor apparently feared 
that if the Bank of England remained responsible for the prudential supervision of 
                                                                                                                                     
controversy in which highly risky financial products were inappropriately sold to pension funds 
without adequate supervision or disclosure. Id. at 267-268. 
39 Id. at 268. 
40 See infra notes 103-105 and accompanying text. 
41 Id. at 3. For a recent discussion of the Australian reorganization, which began in 1996 
(and thus preceded the U.K.), see Schooner and Taylor, supra note 21, at 340-341. The Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”) is the “consumer protection” agency under this 
“twin peaks” approach, and the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (“APRA”) supervises 
bank “safety and soundness.” Still, the “twin peaks” model was not fully accepted in Australia as 
ASIC, the securities regulator, does retain supervisory jurisdiction over the “safety and soundness” 
of investment banks. Thus, some element of functional regulation remains. 
42 Michael Taylor, TWIN PEAKS:  A Regulatory Structure for the New Century (Centre 
for the Study of Financial Institutions 1995) at i (Executive Summary). For a quick review of 
Taylor’s work, see Cynthia Crawford Lichtenstein, The Fed’s New Model of Supervision for 
“Large Complex Banking Organizations”:  Coordinated Risk-Based Supervision of Financial 
Multinationals for International Financial Stability, 18 Transnational Lawyer 283, 295-296 (2005). 
43 Lichtenstein, supra note 42, at 295. 
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banks, its independence in setting interest rates might be compromised by its fear 
that raising interest rates would cause bank failures for which it would be blamed. 
In part for this reason, the eventual legislation shifted responsibility for bank 
supervision from the Bank of England to the FSA. 
It approaches the self-evident to note that a conflict exists between the 
consumer protection role of a universal regulator and its role as a “prudential” 
regulator intent on protecting the safety and soundness of the financial institution. 
The goal of consumer protection is most obviously advanced through deterrence 
and financial sanctions, but these can deplete assets and ultimately threaten bank 
solvency. When only modest financial penalties are used, this conflict may sound 
more theoretical than real. But, as discussed later, the U.S. is distinctive in the 
severity of the penalties it imposes on financial institutions. In recent years, the 
SEC has imposed restitution and penalties exceeding $3 billion annually and 
private plaintiffs received a record $17 billion in securities class action 
settlements in 2006.44 Over a recent ten year period, some 2,400 securities class 
actions were filed and resulted in settlements of over $27 billion (and attorneys’ 
fees of approximately $7 billion), with much of this cost (as in the Enron and 
Worldcom cases) being borne by investment banks.45 If one agency were seeking 
both to protect consumers and guard the solvency of major financial institutions, 
it might find it a very difficult balancing act to achieve both goals and also assure 
a skeptical public that it had not been “captured” by its regulated firms. 
Even in jurisdictions adopting the universal regulator model, the need to 
contemporaneously strengthen enforcement has been part of the reform package. 
Although the 2000 legislation in the U.K. did not adopt the “twin peaks” format, 
it did significantly strengthen the consumer protection role of its centralized 
regulator. The Financial Services and Markets Act, enacted in 2000, sets out four 
statutory objectives, of which the fourth objective was the “reduction of financial 
crime.”46 According to Michael Taylor, this represented “a major extension of the 
FSA’s powers compared to the agencies it replaced,”47 and it reflected a political 
response to the experience of weak enforcement by self-regulatory bodies, which 
had led to the creation of the FSA.48 With probably unintended irony, Taylor and 
a co-author have described this new statutory objective of reducing “financial 
crime” as the “one aspect of U.K. regulatory reform in which its proponents 
seems to have drawn direct inspiration from U.S. law and practice.”49 
Conspicuously, the Blueprint ignores that “modernizing” financial regulation in 
other countries has generally meant strengthening enforcement. 
                                                 
44 See text and notes infra at notes 54 and 95. 
45 See Richard Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We Know It, 4 
Berkeley Bus. L. J. 1, at *3 (2007). 
46 See Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, pt. 1, 6. 
47 See Schooner and Taylor, supra note 21, at 335. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 336. 
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D. A Preliminary Evaluation 
Three preliminary conclusions merit emphasis:   
First, whether the existing financial regulatory structure in the United 
States is considered “institutional” or “functional” in design, its contemporary 
impact seem clear:  it invites regulatory arbitrage. Financial institutions position 
themselves to fall within the jurisdiction of the most accommodating regulator, 
and investment banks design new financial products so as to encounter the least 
regulatory oversight. Such arbitrage can be defended as desirable if one believes 
that regulators inherently overregulate, but not if one believes increased systemic 
risk is a valid concern (as the Blueprint appears to believe). 
Second, the Blueprint’s history of recent regulatory reform involves an 
element of historical fiction. The 2000 legislation in the U.K., which created the 
FSA as a nearly universal regulator, was not an attempt to introduce self-
regulation by SROs (as the Blueprint seems to assume), but a sharp reaction by a 
Labour Government to the failures of self-regulation. Similarly, Japan’s slow, 
back-and-forth movement in the direction of a single regulator seems to have been 
motivated by an unending series of scandals and a desire to give its regulator at 
least the appearance of being less industry dominated.50 
Third, the debate between the “universal” regulator and the “twin peaks” 
alternative should not obscure the fact that both are “superregulators” that have 
moved beyond “functional” regulation on the premise that, as the lines between 
banks, securities dealers, and insurers blur, so regulators should similarly 
converge. That idea will and should remain at the heart of the U.S. debate, even 
after many of the Blueprint’s proposals are forgotten. 
Part II:  The U.S. Context:  Has There Been a Regulatory Failure? 
Whatever the trends elsewhere, a comparative survey of regulatory 
consolidation and reorganization cannot tell us what the United States should do. 
That is a prescriptive problem that simple description of changes elsewhere 
cannot resolve. Moreover, as just noted, the closer one looks at structural reforms 
in other major capital markets, the more one finds that they too were driven 
mainly by country-specific events (i.e., scandals and politics), and not by general 
theory. 
                                                 
50 Japan has a history and a regulatory culture of economic management of its financial 
institutions through regulatory bodies that is entirely distinct from that of Europe or the United 
States. Although it has recently created a Financial Services Agency, observers contend that it 
remains committed to its traditional system of bureaucratic regulation that supports its large banks 
and discourages foreign competition. See Markham, supra note 28, at 383-393 and 396. 
Nonetheless, scandals have been the primary force driving institutional change there too, and 
Japan’s FSA was created at least in part because Japan’s Ministry of Finance (“MOF”) had 
become embarrassed by recurrent scandals. 
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How then is the U.S. distinctive? And how should this influence the place 
of securities regulation within the U.S. regulatory structure? In this section, we 
briefly survey how the U.S. is different from Europe and then turn to the more 
controversial topic:  what responsibility should the SEC bear for recent scandals 
and crashes. Here, we write against a backdrop where a legion of “law and 
economics” scholars have launched tirades of criticism against the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and fulminated generally about the costs of overregulation. Although 
we do not mean to defend Sarbanes-Oxley against all criticism, we believe the 
current subprime mortgage meltdown and the resulting “credit crunch” reveal that 
there are costs to underregulation, and at present these latter costs may be greater. 
A. How is the U.S. Different? 
Of course, this involves restating some obvious points: 
1. The Higher Level of Retail Ownership. Although institutional investors 
may today dominate trading in the U.S. securities markets, the fact remains that 
most U.S. households own equity securities, and nearly three-fourths of 
Americans’ liquid financial assets are invested in securities-related products.51 
This uniquely high level of individual ownership implies both a need for some 
paternalism in securities regulation and the inevitability that there will be a 
political demand for strong enforcement. Even the most closely comparable 
securities market (namely, that of the U.K.) is significantly different. There, 
securities ownership is much more concentrated in institutions, with a low and 
declining level of individual ownership.52 Not surprisingly, when institutions 
dominate the market, there is less demand for aggressive enforcement (because 
today’s aggrieved victim may be tomorrow’s defendant). In such an environment, 
regulators act primarily based on consensus and discipline primarily through 
“regulatory frowns.” 
2. The Tradition of Strong Enforcement. Whether measured in terms of 
market capitalization or gross domestic product, the disparity between the levels 
of financial penalties imposed by the SEC versus those imposed by regulators in 
                                                 
51 For an overview, see J. Coffee, J. Seligman, and H. Sale, SECURITIES 
REGULATION:  Cases and Materials (10th ed. 2007) at 3. 
52  As of October 2008, the percentage of shares held by “private investors” (i.e., non-
institutional shareholders) in U.K. listed companies had fallen to 9.6% (which was consistent with 
the level of such ownership in the 1980s, prior to later privatization efforts by the British 
Government). See Matthew Vincent, “Value of private holdings hits low,” Financial Times, 
October 19, 2008 at p. 15. At its peak, private ownership hit 20% in 1994. Id. During the 1990s, 
the level of individual ownership rose as the result of the Thatcher Government’s privatization of 
government-owned enterprises, but even this 20% level never approached the U.S. level of 
individual ownership, which has not fallen below 30%. See John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., 
Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers and Why?—The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and 
U.K. Takeover Regulation 50–51 (European Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper No. 
73, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=928928 (comparing U.S. and U.K. institutional 
ownership and revealing U.K. ownership in 2004 approximately 10% higher than U.S.). 
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other major capital markets is extraordinary.53 In recent years, the SEC has 
obtained penalties or financial restitution from defendants in amounts exceeding 
$3 billion per year.54 In sharp contrast, the U.K.’s FSA imposed fines of only 5.3 
million pounds in 2007, down from 13.3 million pounds in 2006.55 Thus, 
comparing the SEC to its most closely comparable regulator, the FSA, the ratio in 
recoveries seems to be nearly 300 to 1 in 2007 and probably around 100 to 1 for 
most recent years. Moreover, the SEC is only one of several public enforcers in 
the U.S. (FINRA and the states also impose large penalties and obtain 
settlements). Finally, private enforcement obtains greater recoveries than public 
enforcement. For example, in 2006, securities class action settlements peaked at 
over $17 billion. Criminal enforcement of securities fraud cases is similarly 
common in the U.S. and virtually unknown in Europe (in 2008, FSA brought the 
first criminal cases for insider trading in its history). 
Why does the U.S. display such greater enforcement intensity? The 
answer may lie in its higher level of retail ownership (and a resulting greater 
political demand for enforcement), or it may lie historically in the traditional 
Populist skepticism of Wall Street, which goes back at least to the late 19th 
Century (and possibly earlier). Curiously, the enforcement disparity seems to be 
growing, even as U.S. and European corporate governance appear to be 
converging in other respects. 
This marked variation in enforcement intensity leads to an obvious policy 
debate:  Does the U.S. overenforce? Or, does the rest of the world underenforce? 
In this light, we think the next factor is critical. 
3. Equity Compensation. During the 1980s, the U.S. moved almost 
overnight from a system in which senior managers were primarily compensated in 
cash to one in which they were primarily compensated in equity (through stock 
options). This change was partly driven by tax considerations and partly by 
institutional investor pressure (as the institutions believed that senior management 
was often too indifferent to their firm’s stock price). Whatever the reason, the 
result was that corporate governance in the U.S. now uses a very high octane fuel 
to incentivize managers. As a result, there may be far greater reason for senior 
management in U.S. companies to seek to inflate earnings or understate liabilities 
                                                 
53 For detailed comparisons, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market:  The Impact of 
Enforcement, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 229 (2007); Howell E. Jackson, Variations in the Intensity of 
Financial Regulation:  Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 Yale J. on Reg. 253 
(2007). 
54 In 2004, 2005, and 2006, the total of SEC obtained restitution, disgorgement and 
penalties was, $3.1 billion, $3.1 billion and $3.275 billion, respectively. See Eric Zitzewitz, An 
Eliot Effect? Prosecutorial Discretion in Mutual Fund Settlement Negotiations, 2003-7, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1091035 (April 21, 2008) at Table 1. 
55 See Jonathan Sibun, “Tough-Talking Regulator Hands Out Smaller Fines,” The 
Sunday Telegraph, December 30, 2007; “Watchdog Fines at Six-Year Low, as City Keeps to 
Rules,” Yorkshire Post, December 31, 2007. The average fine in 2007 was 232,000 pounds and 
only one fine was over one million pounds. 
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than for their counterparts in Europe to do so. This may be the common 
denominator that best links the stock market scandals of 2001-2002 that led to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act with the debt markets crisis of 2008. Indeed, this 
phenomenon of a compensation system that engenders a short-term orientation is 
particularly strong within the finance industry where the combination of stock 
options plus annual cash bonuses in the millions of dollars gives rise to 
extraordinary pressures on managers to close deals at all costs. Arguably, senior 
executives of U.S. financial institutions opted for higher levels of leverage over 
the last decade, both because it enhanced short-term profitability and because a 
risk-neutral stock market tolerated, and even demanded, acceptance of higher 
levels of risk – even as the brink of insolvency was neared. 
The ability of senior management in U.S. companies to pursue higher risk 
policies follows not only from the differences in compensation but also from 
differences in the structure of share ownership. Europe is characterized by 
concentrated ownership; the U.S., by dispersed ownership and what Berle and 
Means called the “separation of ownership and control.” In a concentrated 
ownership system, the controlling owners are not diversified, and they can and do 
monitor management, whereas in a dispersed ownership system, dispersed 
shareholders are both more diversified and less able to monitor or constrain 
management. Possibly because there are significant limitations on the ability of 
dispersed shareholders to monitor, greater investment in public enforcement is 
necessary to keep agency costs under control. Equally important, in a 
concentrated ownership system, controlling shareholders generally have little 
incentive to maximize the day-to-day stock price of their firm.56 Unlike managers 
in a dispersed ownership system, they cannot simply exercise stock options and 
dump the stock into the market, because by definition they hold large and illiquid 
blocks and do not wish to increase their already undiversified position. Nor is it 
likely that controlling shareholders plan to sell in the short-term. Even when they 
do wish to sell, they will typically do so in privately negotiated control sales to an 
incoming controlling shareholder at a premium that is not closely related to the 
market price. For all these reasons, while controlling shareholders may overreach, 
they typically have little reason to engage in short-term market manipulation. 
B. What Went Wrong?:  A Very Brief Tour of the Meltdown 
Finger-pointing and blame allocation are time-honored academic 
activities, which unfortunately have about the same social utility as locking the 
barn door after the horse has been stolen. Nonetheless, before re-organizing 
financial regulation from the ground up (as the Treasury’s Blueprint does), it is 
essential to ask:  What went wrong? What do these market and regulatory failures 
indicate about the prerequisites for effective regulation? 
                                                 
56 See Coffee, A Theory of Corporate Scandals:  Why the U.S. and Europe Differ, 21 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 198 (2005). 
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Where did the crisis begin? Although the deeper origins of the 2008 
financial meltdown may lie in deregulatory measures, taken both by Congress and 
the SEC, that placed some categories of derivatives and some entities beyond 
effective regulation,57 most accounts start by describing the rapid inflation of a 
bubble in the U.S. housing market. But the term “bubble” can be a substitute for 
closer analysis and may carry a misleading connotation of inevitability. In truth, 
bubbles fall into two basic categories: those that are demand-driven and those that 
are supply-driven. Most bubbles fall into the former category,58 but the 2008 
financial market meltdown was clearly a supply-driven bubble,59 fueled by the 
fact that mortgage loan originators had come to realize that underwriters were 
increasingly willing to buy portfolios of mortgage loans for asset-backed 
securitizations without seriously investigating the underlying collateral.  
The evidence is clear that between 2001 and 2006, an extraordinary 
increase occurred in the supply of mortgage funds, with much of this increased 
supply being channeled into poorer communities in which previously there had 
been a high denial rate on mortgage loan applications.60 With an increased supply 
of mortgage credit, housing prices rose rapidly, as new buyers entered the market. 
But at the same time, a corresponding increase in mortgage debt relative to 
income levels in these same communities made these loans precarious. Two 
University of Chicago Business School professors have found that two years after 
this period of increased mortgage availability began, a corresponding increase 
started in mortgage defaults – in exactly the same zip code areas where there had 
been a high previous rate of mortgage loan denials.61 They determined that a one 
standard deviation in the supply of mortgages from 2001 to 2004 produced a one 
standard deviation increase thereafter in mortgage default rates.62  
Even more striking, however, is their finding that the rate of mortgage 
defaults was highest in those neighborhoods that had the highest rates of 
securitization.63 Not only did securitization correlate with a higher rate of default, 
but that rate of default was highest when the mortgages were sold by the loan 
                                                 
57 Interestingly, this is the diagnosis that SEC Chairman Christopher Cox recently 
presented to the Senate Banking Committee. See text and notes infra at notes 90 to 91. He stressed 
the failure of Congress to give the SEC jurisdiction over investment bank holding companies or 
over-the-counter derivatives (including credit default swaps). 
58 For example, the high-tech Internet bubble that burst in early 2000 was a demand-
driven bubble. Investors simply overestimated the value of the Internet, and for a time initial 
public offerings of “dot.com” companies would trade at ridiculous and unsustainable multiples. 
But full disclosure was provided to investors and the SEC cannot be faulted in this bubble – unless 
one assigns it the very paternalistic responsibility of protecting investors from themselves. 
59 This is best evidenced by the work of two University of Chicago Business School 
professors discussed below. See Atif Mian and Amir Sufi, “The Consequences of Mortgage Credit 
Expansion: Evidence from the 2007 Mortgage Default Crisis, (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1072304) 
(May 2008). 
60 Id. at 11 to 13. 
61 Id. at 18-19. 
62 Id. at 19. 
63 Id. at 20-21. 
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originator to financial firms unaffiliated with the loan originator.64 Other 
researchers have reached a similar conclusion: conditional on being securitized, a 
loan portfolio that is more likely to be securitized defaults by about 20% more 
than a similar risk profile loan portfolio that is less likely to be securitized.65 
Why? The most plausible interpretation is that securitization adversely affects the 
incentives of lenders to screen their borrowers. 
Such a conclusion should not surprise. It simply reflects the classic “moral 
hazard” problem that arises once loan originators do not bear the cost of default 
by their borrowers. As early as March, 2008, The President’s Working Group on 
Financial Markets issued a “Policy Statement on Financial Market 
Developments” that explained the financial crisis as the product of five “principal 
underlying causes of the turmoil in financial markets”: 
“● a breakdown in underwriting standards for subprime mortgages; 
● a significant erosion of market discipline by those involved in the 
securitization process, including originators, underwriters, credit rating 
agencies, and global investors, related in part to failures to provide or 
obtain adequate risk disclosures; 
● flaws in credit rating agencies’ assessment of subprime residential 
mortgages . . . and other complex structured credit products, . . . 
● risk management weaknesses at some large U.S. and European 
financial institutions; and 
● regulatory policies, including capital and disclosure requirements, that 
failed to mitigate risk management weaknesses.”66 
Correct as the President’s Working Group was in noting the connection 
between the decline of discipline in the mortgage loan origination market and a 
similar laxity among underwriters in the capital markets, it largely ignored the 
direction of the causality. In retrospect, irresponsible lending in the mortgage 
market appears to have been a direct response to the capital markets’ increasingly 
insatiable demand for financial assets to securitize. If underwriters were willing to 
rush deeply flawed asset-backed securitizations to the market, mortgage loan 
originators had no rational reason to resist them.  
                                                 
64 Id. 
65 See Benjamin J. Keys, Tanmoy K. Mukherjee, Amit Seru, and Vikrant Vig, “Did 
Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans,” 
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093137) (April, 2008). These authors conclude that securitization did 
result in “lax screening.” 
66 The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, “Policy Statement on Financial 
Market Developments,” at 1 (March 2008). 
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Thus, the real mystery is not why loan originators made unsound loans, 
but why underwriters bought them. Anecdotal evidence suggests that due 
diligence efforts within the underwriting community slackened in asset-backed 
securitizations after 2000.67 Others have suggested that the SEC contributed to 
this decline by softening its disclosure and due diligence standards for asset-
backed securitizations,68 in particular by adopting in 2005 Regulation AB, which 
covers the issuance of asset backed securities.69 At this point, it becomes plausible 
that failures in regulatory oversight, including by the SEC, may have played a 
greater causal role in the debacle than has been generally emphasized (even if the 
SEC had no responsibility or capacity to monitor the mortgage loan origination 
process). 
Still, any inquiry into why underwriters bought risky loan portfolios 
without adequate due diligence or why the SEC narrowly defined the disclosure 
obligations of issuers in securitizations defines the problem too narrowly. The 
danger here is that one may “miss the forest for the trees.” If one takes instead a 
broader “before and after” perspective, the most striking fact about this crisis is 
that the United States, as of the beginning of 2008, had five major investment 
banks that were not owned by a larger commercial bank: Merrill Lynch, Goldman 
Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns. By the late Fall of 
2008, all of these investment banks had either failed or abandoned their status as 
independent investment banks. Two (Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch) had been 
forced at the brink of insolvency to merge with larger commercial banks in 
transactions orchestrated by banking regulators. One – Lehman Brothers – had 
filed for bankruptcy, and the two remaining investment banks – Goldman Sachs 
and Morgan Stanley – had converted into bank holding companies under pressure 
                                                 
67 Investment banks formerly relied on “due diligence” firms that they employed to 
determine whether the loans within a loan portfolio were within standard parameters. These firms 
would investigate and inform the underwriter as to the percentage of the loans that were 
“exception” loans (i.e., loans outside the investment bank’s normal guidelines). Subsequent to 
2000, the percentage of “exception loans” in portfolios securitized by these banks often rose from 
the former level of 25% to as high as 80%. Also, the underwriters scaled back the intensity of the 
investigations that they would authorize the “due diligence” firm to conduct, reducing from 30% 
to as few as 5% the number of loans in a portfolio that it was to check. See Vikas Bajaj & Jenny 
Anderson, “Inquiry Focuses on Withholding of Data on Loans,” N.Y. Times, January 12, 2008 at 
p. A-1. 
68 See Richard Mendales, “Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities Regulation 
Failed to Prevent the CDO Meltdown And How To Fix It” (Working Paper 2008) at 36. 
69 See Securities Act Release No. 8518 (“Asset-Backed Securities”) (January 7, 2005), 79 
FR 1506). Regulation AB codified a series of “no action” letters and established disclosures 
standards for all asset-backed securitizations. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.1100-1123 (2005). Although it 
did not represent a sharp deregulatory break with the past, Regulation AB did reduce the due 
diligence obligation of underwriters by eliminating any need to assure that assets included in a 
securitized pool were adequately documented. Professor Mendales has pointed out that 
government sponsored entities, such as Ginny Mae, had required such documentation. See 
Mendales, supra note 68, at 36. His point is that Regulation AB should have adopted the 
procedures used by housing-related GSEs, such as Ginny Mae, which mandated quality control 
procedures. Id.  
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from the Federal Reserve Bank, thus moving from SEC to Federal Reserve 
supervision.70 Each of these firms had survived prior recessions, market panics, 
and repeated turmoil and had long histories extending back as far as the pre-Civil 
War era. Yet, each either failed or was gravely imperiled within the same 
basically six month period following the collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008. 
If their uniform collapse was not enough to suggest the possibility of 
regulatory failure, one additional common fact unites them: each of these five 
firms voluntarily entered into the SEC’s Consolidated Supervised Entity (“CSE”) 
Program, which was established by the SEC in 2004 for only the largest 
investment banks.71 Indeed, these five investment banks were the only investment 
banks permitted by the SEC to enter the CSE program. A key attraction of the 
CSE Program was that it permitted its members to escape the SEC’s traditional 
net capital rule, which placed a maximum ceiling on their debt to equity ratios, 
and instead elect into a more relaxed “alternative net capital rule” that contained 
no similar limitation.72 The result was predictable:  all five of these major 
investment banks increased their debt-to-equity leverage ratios significantly in the 
period following their entry into the CSE Program, as shown by Figure 1 below:73 
                                                 
70 For a concise overview of these developments, see Jon Hilsenrath, Damian Palette, and 
Aaron Lucchetti, “Goldman, Morgan Scrap Wall Street Model, Become Banks in Bid to Ride Out 
Crisis,” The Wall Street Journal, September 22, 2008 at p. A-1 (concluding that independent 
investment banks could not survive under current market conditions and needed closer regulatory 
supervision to establish credibility). 
71 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-49830 (June 21, 2004), 69 FR 34428 
(“Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated 
Supervised Entities”). 
72 The SEC’s “net capital rule,” which dates back to 1975, governs the capital adequacy 
and aggregate indebtedness permitted for most broker-dealers. See Rule 15c3-1 (“Net Capital 
Requirements for Brokers and Dealers”). 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1. Under subparagraph (a)(1)(i) of 
this rule, aggregate indebtedness is limited to fifteen times the broker-dealer’s net capital; a 
broker-dealer may elect to be governed instead by subparagraph (a)(1)(ii) of this rule, which 
requires it maintain its net capital at not less than the greater of $250,000 or two percent of 
“aggregate debit items” as computed under a special formula that gives “haircuts” (i.e., reduces 
the valuation) of illiquid securities. Both variants place fixed limits on leverage. 
73 This chart comes from U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the 
Inspector General, “SEC’s Oversight of Bear Stearns and Related Entities: The Consolidated 
Entity Program (“Report No. 446-A, September 25, 2008) (hereinafter “SEC Inspector General 
Report”) at Appendix IX at p. 120. 
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That higher leverage, coupled with a high concentration of their assets in 
subprime mortgages and related real estate assets, left them exposed and 
vulnerable when market conditions soured in 2007-2008. For example, at the time 
of its insolvency, Bear Stearns’ gross leverage ratio had hit 33 to 1.74 
These facts may seem to corroborate a now popular hypothesis:  excessive 
deregulation by the SEC caused the liquidity crisis that swept the global markets 
in 2008.75 The problem with this simple hypothesis is that it is just too simple. 
Deregulation may well have contributed to the 2008 financial crisis, but the 
SEC’s adoption of the CSE Program in 2004 was not intended to be deregulatory. 
Rather, the program was intended to compensate for earlier deregulatory efforts 
by Congress that had left the SEC unable to monitor the overall financial position 
and risk management practices of the nation’s largest investment banks. Still, if 
the 2004 net capital rule changes were not intended to be deregulatory, they 
worked out that way in practice. The ironic bottom line is that the SEC 
unintentionally deregulated by introducing an alternative net capital rule that it 
could not effectively monitor. 
                                                 
74 See SEC Inspector General Report at 19. 
75 For the strongest statement of this thesis, see Stephen Labaton, “S.E.C. Concedes 
Oversight Plans Fueled Collapse,” New York Times, September 27, 2008 at p. 1. Nonetheless, this 
analysis is oversimple. Although SEC Chairman Cox did indeed acknowledge that there were 
flaws in the “Consolidated Supervised Entity” Program, he did not concede that it “fueled” the 
collapse or that it represented deregulation. As discussed below, the SEC probably legitimately 
believed that it was gaining regulatory authority from the CSE Program (but it was wrong). 
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The events leading up to the SEC’s decision to relax its net capital rule for 
the largest investment banks began in 2002, when the European Union adopted its 
Financial Conglomerates Directive.76 The main thrust of the E.U.’s new directive 
was to require regulatory supervision at the parent company level of financial 
conglomerates that included a regulated financial institution (e.g., a broker-dealer, 
bank or insurance company). The E.U.’s entirely reasonable fear was that the 
parent company might take actions that could jeopardize the solvency of the 
regulated subsidiary. The E.U.’s directive potentially applied to the major U.S. 
investment and commercial banks because all did substantial business in London 
(and elsewhere in Europe). But the E.U.’s directive contained an exemption for 
foreign financial conglomerates that were regulated by their home countries in a 
way that was deemed “equivalent” to that envisioned by the directive. For the 
major U.S. commercial banks (several of which operated a major broker-dealer as 
a subsidiary), this afforded them an easy means of avoiding group-wide 
supervision by regulators in Europe, because they were subject to group-level 
supervision by U.S. banking regulators. But U.S. investment banks had no similar 
escape hatch, as the SEC had no similar oversight over their parent companies. 
Thus, fearful of hostile regulation by some European regulators,77 U.S. investment 
banks lobbied the SEC for a system of “equivalent” regulation that would be 
sufficient to satisfy the terms of the directive and give them immunity from 
European oversight.78 For the SEC, this offered a serendipitous opportunity to 
oversee the operations of investment bank holding companies, which authority the 
SEC had sought for some time. Following the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, 
the SEC had asked Congress to empower it to monitor investment bank holding 
companies, but it had been rebuffed. Thus, the voluntary entry of the holding 
companies into the Consolidated Supervised Entity program must have struck the 
SEC as a welcome development, and Commission unanimously approved the 
program without any partisan disagreement.79  
But the CSE Program came with an added (and probably unnecessary) 
corollary: Firms that entered the CSE Program were permitted to adopt an 
alternative and more relaxed net capital rule governing their debt to net capital 
ratio. Under the traditional net capital rule, a broker-dealer was subject to fixed 
                                                 
76 See Council Directive 2002/87, Financial Conglomerates Directive, 2002 O.J. (L 35) of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the supplementary 
supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial 
conglomerate and amending Council Directives. For an overview of this directive and its rationale, 
see Jorge E. Vinuales, The International Regulation of Financial Conglomerates: A Case Study of 
Equivalence as an Approach to Financial Integration, 37 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 1, at 2 (2006).  
77 Different European regulators appear to have been feared by different entities. Some 
commercial banks saw French regulation as potentially hostile, while U.S. broker-dealers, all 
largely based in London, did not want their holding companies to be overseen by the U.K.’s 
Financial Services Agency (“FSA”). 
78 See Stephen Labaton, “Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up Debt and Risk,” New 
York Times, October 3, 2008 at A-1 (describing major investment banks as having made an 
“urgent plea” to the SEC in April, 2004). 
79 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-49830, supra note 71. 
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ceilings on its permissible leverage. Specifically, it either had to (a) maintain 
aggregate indebtedness at a level that could not exceed fifteen times net capital,80 
or (b) maintain minimum net capital equal to not less than two percent of 
“aggregate debit items.”81 For most broker-dealers, this 15 to 1 debt to net capital 
ratio was the operative limit within which they needed to remain by a comfortable 
margin. 
Why did the SEC allow the major investment banks to elect into an 
alternative regime that placed no outer limit on leverage? Most likely, the 
Commission was principally motivated by the belief that it was only emulating 
the more modern and advanced “Basel II” standards used by the Federal Reserve 
Bank. To be sure, the investment banks undoubtedly knew that adoption of Basel 
II standards would permit them to increase leverage (and they lobbied hard for 
such a change). From the SEC’s perspective, however, it designed the CSE 
Program to be broadly consistent with the Federal Reserve’s oversight of bank 
holding companies, and it even incorporated the same capital ratio that the 
Federal Reserve mandated for bank holding companies.82 In addition, the CSE 
Program required its participants to maintain “tentative net capital” of at least $1 
billion and to notify the Commission if tentative net capital fell below $5 billion.83 
The difference may seem modest; the SEC may have been overreached, but it was 
not “captured.” Still, this difference goes to the agency’s integrity. 
So what went wrong? The SEC’s Inspector General examined the failure 
of Bear Stearns and the SEC’s responsibility therefor and reported that Bear 
Stearns had remained in compliance with the CSE Program’s rules at all relevant 
times.84 Thus, if Bear Stearns had not cheated, this implied (as the Inspector 
General found) that the CSE Program, itself, had failed. That seems fair enough, 
but this conclusion still does not mean that the retention of the standard net capital 
rule (with its 15:1 debt to net capital ratio) would have saved any of the CSE 
Program’s investment banks from the liquidity crisis that enveloped them. A close 
reading of the Inspector General’s report suggests that the real problem lay less in 
the specific terms of CSE’s Program’s rules than in SEC’s staff inability to 
monitor the participating investment banks closely or to demand specific actions 
                                                 
80 See Rule 15c3-1(a)(1)(i)(“Alternative Indebtedness Standard”), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-
1(a)(1). 
81 See Rule 15c3-1(a)(1)(ii)(“Alternative Standard”), 17 C.F.R. §240.15c3-1(a)(1)(ii). 
This alternative standard is framed in terms of the greater of $250,000 or two percent, but for any 
investment bank of any size, two percent will be the greater. Although this alternative standard 
may sound less restrictive, it was implemented by a system of “haircuts” that wrote down the 
value of investment assets to reflect their illiquidity. 
82 See SEC Inspector General Report at 10-11. Under these standards, a “well-
capitalized” bank was expected to maintain a 10 percent capital ratio. Id. at 11. Nonetheless, 
others have argued that Basel II “was not designed to be used by investment banks” and that the 
SEC “ought to have been more careful in moving banks on to the new rules.” See “Mewling and 
Puking: Bank Regulation,” The Economist, October 25, 2008 (U.S. Edition). 
83 Id. at 11. 
84 Id. at 10. 
John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale 25 
 25
by them. Basel II’s approach to the regulation of capital adequacy at financial 
institutions contemplated close monitoring and supervision. Thus, the Federal 
Reserve assigns members of its staff to maintain an office within a regulated bank 
holding company in order to provide constant oversight. In the case of the SEC, a 
team of only three SEC staffers were assigned to each CSE firm85 (and a total of 
only thirteen individuals comprised the SEC’s Office of Prudential Supervision 
and Risk Analysis that oversaw and conducted this monitoring effort).86 From the 
start, it was a mismatch:  three SEC staffers to oversee an investment bank the 
size of Merrill Lynch, which could easily afford to hire scores of highly 
quantitative economists and financial analysts, implied that the SEC was simply 
outgunned.87  
This mismatch was compounded by the inherently individualized criteria 
upon which Basel II relies. Instead of applying a uniform standard (such as a 
specific debt to equity ratio) to all financial institutions, Basel II contemplated 
that each regulated financial institution would develop a computer model that 
would generate risk estimates for the specific assets held by that institution and 
that these estimates would determine the level of capital necessary to protect that 
institution from insolvency. Thus, using the Basel II methodology, the investment 
bank generates a mathematical model that crunches historical data to evaluate 
how risky its portfolio assets were and how much capital it needed to maintain to 
protect them. Necessarily, each model was ad hoc, specifically fitted to that 
specific financial institution. But no team of three SEC staffers was in a position 
to contest these individualized models or the historical data used by them. Thus, 
the impact of the Basel II methodology was to shift the balance of power in favor 
of the management of the investment bank and to diminish the negotiating 
position of the SEC’s staff. The problem was less that Basel II’s criteria were 
inherently flawed than that it was a sophisticated tool that was beyond the 
capacity of the SEC’s largely legal staff to administer effectively. 
The SEC’s Inspector General’s Report bears out this critique by describing 
a variety of instances surrounding the collapse of Bear Stearns in which the SEC’s 
staff did not respond to red flags that the Inspector General, exercising 20/20 
hindsight, considered to be obvious. The Report finds that although the SEC’s 
staff was aware that Bear Stearns had a heavy and increasing concentration in 
mortgage securities, it “did not make any efforts to limit Bear Stearns mortgage 
securities concentration.”88 In its recommendations, the Report proposed both that 
the staff become “more skeptical of CSE firms’ risk models” and that it “develop 
                                                 
85 Id. at 2. 
86 Id. Similarly, the Office of CSE Inspectors had only seven staff. Id. 
87 Moreover, the process effectively ceased to function well before the 2008 crisis hit. 
After SEC Chairman Cox re-organized the CSE review process in the Spring of 2007, the staff did 
not thereafter complete “a single inspection.” See Labaton, supra note 78. 
88 Id. at ix. 
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additional stress scenarios that have not already been contemplated as part of the 
prudential regulation process.”89 
But is this proposal realistic? Can the SEC’s staff really hope to regulate 
through gentle (or even less-than-gentle) persuasion? Unlike a prophylactic rule 
(such as the SEC’s traditional net capital rule that placed a uniform ceiling on 
leverage for all broker-dealers), the identification of “additional stress scenarios” 
by the SEC’s staff does not necessarily lead to specific actions by the CSE firms; 
rather, such attempts at persuasion are more likely to produce an extended 
dialogue, with the SEC’s staff being confronted with counter-models and 
interpretations by the financial institution’s managers. 
Our sense that the SEC cannot negotiate successfully for voluntary 
compliance in an area where the investment banks have strong economic interests 
is confirmed by a similar assessment from the person with perhaps the most 
recent experience in this area. In his September, 2008 testimony before a Senate 
committee, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox emphasized the infeasibility of 
voluntary compliance , expressing his frustration with attempts to negotiate issues 
such as leverage and risk management practices with the CSE firms. In a 
remarkable statement for a long-time proponent of deregulation, he testified: 
“[B]eyond highlighting the inadequacy of the . . . CSE program’s 
capital and liquidity requirements, the last six months – during 
which the SEC and the Federal Reserve worked collaboratively 
with each of the CSE firms . . . – have made abundantly clear that 
voluntary regulation doesn’t work.”90 
His point was that the SEC had no inherent authority to order a CSE firm to 
reduce its debt to equity ratio or to keep it in the CSE Program.91 If it objected, a 
potentially endless regulatory negotiation might only begin. 
Ultimately, even if one absolves the SEC of “selling out” to the industry in 
adopting the CSE Program in 2004, it is still clear at a minimum that the SEC 
                                                 
89 Id. at xi. 
90 See Testimony of SEC Chairman Christopher Cox before the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, September 23, 2008 (“Testimony Concerning 
Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding Government Sponsored Entities, 
Investment Banks and Other Financial Institutions”), at p. 4 (available at www.sec.gov) (emphasis 
added). Chairman Cox has repeated this theme in a subsequent Op/Ed column in the Washington 
Post, in which he argued that “Reform legislation should steer clear of voluntary regulation and 
grant explicit authority where it is needed.” See Christopher Cox, “Reinventing A Market 
Watchdog,” The Washington Post, November 4, 2008 at A-17. 
91 Chairman Cox added in the next sentence of his Senate testimony: “There is simply no 
provision in the law authorizes the CSE Program, or requires investment bank holding companies 
to compute capital measures or to maintain liquidity on a consolidated basis, or to submit to SEC 
requirements regarding leverage.” Id. This is true, but if a CSE firm left the CSE program, it 
would presumably become subject to European regulation; thus, the system was not entirely 
voluntary and the SEC might have used the threat to expel a non-compliant CSE firm. 
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lacked both the power and the expertise to restrict leverage by the major 
investment banks, at least once the regulatory process began with each bank 
generating its own risk model. Motivated by stock market pressure and the 
incentives of a short-term oriented executive compensation system, senior 
management at these institutions affectively converted the process into self-
regulation. 
One last factor also drove the rush to increased leverage and may best 
explain the willingness of some investment banks to relax their due diligence 
standards: competitive pressure and the need to establish a strong position in a 
new and expanding market. For the major players in the asset-backed 
securitization market, the long-term risk was that they might be cut off from their 
source of supply, as loan originators were acquired or entered into long-term 
relationship with competitors. Needing an assured source of supply, some 
investment banks (most notably Lehman and Merrill, Lynch) invested heavily in 
acquiring loan originators and related real estate companies, thus in effect 
vertically integrating.92 In so doing, they assumed even greater risk by increasing 
their concentration in real estate and thus their undiversified exposure to a 
downturn in that market. This need to stay at least even with one’s competitors 
best explains the now famous line uttered by Charles Prince, the then CEO of 
Citigroup in July, 2007, just as the debt market was beginning to collapse. Asked 
by the Financial Times if he saw a liquidity crisis looming, he answered: 
“When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will get 
complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get 
up and dance. We’re still dancing.”93 
In short, competition among the major investment banks can periodically 
produce a mad momentum that sometimes leads to a lemmings-like race over the 
cliff.94 This in essence had happened in the period just prior to the 2000 dot.com 
                                                 
92 See Terry Pristin, “Risky Real Estate Deals Helped Doom Lehman,” N.Y. Times, 
September 17, 2008 at C-6 (discussing Lehman’s expensive, multi-billion dollar acquisition of 
Archstone-Smith); Gretchen Morgenson, “How the Thundering Herd Faltered and Fell,” N.Y. 
Times, November 9, 2008 at B4-1 (analyzing Merrill Lynch’s failure and emphasizing its 
acquisitions of loan originators). 
93 See Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, “Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on Buy-
Outs,” Financial Times, July 9, 2007, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/80e2987a-2e50-
11dc-821c-0000779fd2ac.html. 
94 Although a commercial bank, Citigroup was no exception this race, impelled by the 
high fee income it involved. From 2003 to 2005, “Citigroup more than tripled its issuing of 
C.D.O.s to more than $30 billion from $6.28 billion. . . .” See Eric Dash and Julie Creswell, 
“Citigroup Pays for a Rush to Risk” N.Y. Times, November 22, 2008 at 1, 34. In 2005 alone, the 
New York Times estimates that Citigroup received over $500 million in fee income from these 
C.D.O. transactions. From being the sixth largest issuer of C.D.O.s in 2003, it rose to being the 
largest C.D.O. issuer worldwide by 2007, issuing in that year some $49.3 billion out of a 
worldwide total of $442.3 billion (or slightly over 11% of the world volume). Id. at 35. 
What motivated this extreme risk-taking? Certain of the managers running Citigroup’s 
securitization business received compensation as high as $34 million per year (even though they 
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bubble, and again during the accounting scandals of 2001-2002, and this process 
repeated itself during subprime mortgage debacle. Once the market becomes hot, 
the threat of civil liability – either to the SEC or to private plaintiffs in securities 
class actions – seems only weakly to constrain this momentum. Rationalizations 
are always available:  “real estate prices never fall;” “the credit rating agencies 
gave this deal a ‘Triple A’ rating,” etc. Explosive growth and a decline in 
professional standards often go hand in hand. Here, after 2000, due diligence 
standards appear to have been relaxed, even as the threat of civil liability in 
private securities litigation was growing.95  
As an explanation for an erosion in professional standards, competitive 
pressure applies with particular force to those investment banks that saw asset-
back securitizations as the core of their future business model. In 2002, a critical 
milestone was reached, as in that year the total amount of debt securities issued in 
asset-backed securitizations equaled (and then exceeded in subsequent years) the 
total amount of debt securities issued by public corporations.96 Debt 
securitizations were not only becoming the leading business of Wall Street, as a 
global market of debt purchasers was ready to rely on investment grade ratings 
from the major credit rating agencies, but they were particularly important for the 
independent investment banks in the CSE Program. Although all underwriters 
anticipated high rates of return from securitizations, the independent underwriters 
had gradually been squeezed out of their traditional line of business – 
underwriting corporate securities – in the wake of the step-by-step repeal of the 
Glass-Steagall Act. Beginning well before the formal repeal of that Act in 1999, 
the major commercial banks had been permitted to underwrite corporate debt 
securities and had increasingly exploited their larger scale and synergistic ability 
to offer both bank loans and underwriting services to gain an increasing share of 
this underwriting market. Especially for the smaller investment banks (e.g., Bear 
Stearns and Lehman), the future lay in new lines of business, where, as nimble 
and adaptive competitors, they could steal a march on the larger and slower 
commercial banks. To a degree, both did, and Merrill eagerly sought to follow in 
                                                                                                                                     
were not among the most senior officers of the bank). Id. at 34. This is consistent with the earlier 
diagnosis that equity compensation inclines management to accept higher and arguably excessive 
risk. At the highest level of Citigroup’s management, the New York Times reports that the 
primary concern was “that Citigroup was falling behind rivals like Morgan Stanley and Goldman.” 
Id. at 34 (discussing Robert Rubin and Charles Prince’s concerns). Competitive pressure is, of 
course, enforced by the stock market and Wall Street’s short-term system of bonus compensation. 
The irony then is that a rational strategy of deleveraging cannot be pursued by making boards and 
managements more sensitive to shareholder desires. 
95 From 1996 to 1999, the settlements in securities class actions totaled only $1.7 billion; 
thereafter, aggregate settlements rose exponentially, hitting a peak of $17.1 billion in 2006 alone. 
See Laura Simmons & Ellen Ryan, “Securities Class Action Settlements: 2006, Review and 
Analysis” (Cornerstone Research 2006) at 1. This decline of due diligence practices as liability 
correspondingly increased seems paradoxical, but may suggest that at least private civil liability 
does not effectively deter issuers or underwriters. 
96 For a chart showing the growth of asset-backed securities in relation to conventional 
corporate debt issuances over recent years, see J. Coffee, J. Seligman, and H. Sale, SECURITIES 
REGULATION: Case and Materials (10th ed. 2006) at p. 10. 
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their wake.97 To stake out a dominant position, the CEOs of these firms adopted a 
“Damn-the-torpedoes-full-speed-ahead” approach that led them to make 
extremely risky acquisitions. Their common goal was to assure themselves a 
continuing source of supply of subprime mortgages to securitize, but in pursuit of 
this goal, both Merrill Lynch and Lehman made risky acquisitions, in effect 
vertically integrating into the mortgage loan origination field. These decisions, 
plus their willingness to acquire mortgage portfolios well in advance of the 
expected securitization transaction, left them undiversified and exposed to large 
writedowns when the real estate market soured. 
So where does this brief history leave us? Our contention is not that 
excessive leverage and inadequate risk management policies were the sole causes 
of the 2008 financial crisis. Much blame can also be fairly assigned to other 
culpable parties, including the credit rating agencies and the Congress for 
deregulating over-the-counter derivatives in 2000.98 Nor were the investment 
banks alone in pursuing high leverage and de-emphasizing risk management 
practices. The private equity firms and some hedge funds also experienced a 
similar bubble and may yet in some cases face insolvency.99 But the unique fact 
about financial institutions in general, and investment banks in particular, is their 
fragility. They finance their business using short-term capital to hold long-term 
illiquid assets. This mismatch exposes investment banks to liquidity crises, and, as 
the crisis mounts, their counter-parties back away and refuse to trade with them. 
This has happened before cyclically, well within the memory of the chief 
executives running these institutions.100 Then as now, the SEC was not effective 
in dealing with this problem. 
                                                 
97 For a detailed description of Merrill, Lynch’s late entry into the asset-backed 
securitization field and its sometimes frenzied attempt to catch up with Lehman by acquiring 
originators of mortgage loans, see Gretchen Morgenson, “How the Thundering Herd Faltered and 
Fell,” N.Y. Times, November 9, 2008, at BU-1. Merrill eventually acquired an inventory of $71 
billion in risky mortgages, in part through acquisitions of loan originators. By mid-2008, an initial 
writedown of $7.9 billion forced the resignation of its CEO. As discussed in this New York Times 
article, loan originators dealing with Merrill believed it did not accurately understand the risks of 
their field. For Lehman’s similar approach to acquisitions of loan originators, see text and note, 
supra, at note 92. 
98 The Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA”) largely withdrew 
swaps and other over-the-counter derivatives from the regulatory jurisdiction of both the SEC and 
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (although both retained anti-fraud jurisdiction). 
99 See Andrew Ross Sorkin and Michael J. de la Merced, “Debt Linked to Huge Buyouts 
Is Tightening the Economic Vise,” N.Y. Times, November 3, 2008 at A-1 (discussing problems 
with recent buyouts by private equity firms); Peter Lattman, Craig Karmin and Pui-Wing Tam, 
“Private Equity Draws the Cold Shoulder,” The Wall Street Journal, November 4, 2008 at C-1. 
100 In 1990, Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., the parent company in a financial 
conglomerate that included a large broker-dealer subsidiary, encountered a financial crisis and 
became unable to roll over its commercial paper and its counterparites similarly declined to trade 
with it. Its bankruptcy (and that of its broker dealer subsidiary) led Congress to enact the Market 
Reform Act of 1990 to add Section 17(b) to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. For a 
review of this last major broker-dealer insolvency before the current crisis, see U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Office of the Inspector General, “SEC’s Oversight of Bear Stearns and 
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Others have suggested that SEC deregulation also resulted in inadequate 
disclosure and insufficient due diligence.101 Here, we are less certain whether 
abbreviated disclosure played a significant causal role, but relaxed due diligence 
was symptomatic of this era. Even if we give the SEC the benefit of the doubt on 
this score, the conclusion still seems inescapable that the SEC was an ineffective 
monitor of leverage and risk management policies at financial institutions under 
its jurisdictions, from at least the time of the Drexel Burnham bankruptcy in 1990 
through the current crisis. Equally important, a major reason for its failure, as 
SEC Chairman Cox has proclaimed,102 was the SEC’s need to rely on “voluntary” 
cooperation and engage in extended negotiations with the investment banks over 
an issue that was central to these banks’ profitability. This is hardly an 
endorsement for the Blueprint’s call for greater self-regulation. 
Perhaps, this may seem an academic criticism because the CSE Program is 
today moribund, and the remaining investment banks have reconstituted 
themselves as bank holding companies. But, for the future, the critical issue is 
what agency or agencies should supervise hedge funds, insurance companies, and 
other financial institutions that are “too big to fail.” Inherently, this involves two 
issues: (1) Who should monitor the safety and soundness of these institutions – 
the SEC or the Federal Reserve?; and (2) What role can safely be given to 
industry self-regulation? Against this backdrop, we turn next to the Treasury’s 
proposals. 
Part III:  Can Principles Replace Rules? 
Recent discussions about reforming the SEC, including the Blueprint, 
have been laced with earnest invocations of the superiority of “principles” as a 
basis for any regulatory reform and a corresponding denigration of “rules-based” 
regulation.103 The Blueprint stresses that a quick change to a principles-oriented 
                                                                                                                                     
Related Entities: Broker-Dealer Risk Assessment Program (Report No. 446-B September 25, 
2008) at 1. The foregoing SEC Inspector General’s Report found the Commission to have poorly 
implemented the Broker-Dealer Risk Assessment Program that had been established pursuant to § 
17(b) in response to the Drexel bankruptcy. 
101 For this view, see Richard Mendales, supra note 68, Professor Mendales argues 
convincingly that (1) the focus of disclosure should be on the quality of the collateral in the 
securitized pool, not on the historical returns on mortgages, and (2) underwriters should be 
required to perform sufficient due diligence to document all the loans in the pool. Regulation AB 
did neither. 
102 See text and notes supra at notes 90 to 91. 
103 See, e.g., Jeremy Grant, US Firms Lobby for Regulation by Principles, Financial 
Times, Sept. 16, 2007, http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto091520071714553553 
(praising the proposed switch to a principles-based regulatory regime because it would improve 
both regulation enforcement and U.S. capital market competitiveness in the world); Adam Shell, 
Paulson Criticizes Regulation, USA Today, Nov. 21, 2006, Money, at 4b (quoting Paulson as 
saying that we must “rise above a rules-based mind-set…and adopt a more principles-based 
approach”). 
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system is vital to maintaining global competitiveness.104 The financial industry 
generally agrees.105 Accordingly, this section reviews the literature on the 
principles versus rules debate. Not surprisingly, we conclude, first, that our 
current system maintains a subtler balance between the two than has generally 
been recognized and, second, that without rules, enforcement, and any sense of 
parity therein, would decline in ways that business would actually find 
unpalatable. 
The standard analysis – both legal and economic – has long recognized 
that a principles-based system of regulation is broader and more fluid than its 
rules-based counterpart. Where a rule delineates, ex ante, allowed conduct, a 
principle provides a more general description of acceptable conduct.106 The 
regulator charged with enforcing the principle decides, ex post, whether particular 
conduct is acceptable and whether the conduct in question violates the 
principle.107  
This balance between the ex ante decision under a rule-based regime and 
the ex post decision under a principle-based system is best illustrated by using the 
example of alternative ways to regulate speed limits.108 A speed limit crafted as a 
rule might prohibit driving above 70 miles an hour. Anyone who does so breaks 
                                                 
104 See, e.g. Jeremy Grant, US Firms Lobby for Regulation by Principles, Financial 
Times, Sept. 16, 2007, http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto091520071714553553; 
Jenny Anderson, On Paper, Wall Street Gets Its Way, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/01/business/01wall.html?_r=1; Adam Shell, Paulson Criticizes 
Regulation, USA Today, 21 Nov. 2006, Money, at 4b (stating that Paulson’s speech was spurred 
on by industry complaints about rules that dampen competitiveness). But see Craig Doidge et al., 
Has New York Become Less Competitive in Global Markets? Evaluating Foreign Listing Choices 
Over Time (Finance Working Paper No. 173, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=982193. 
105 See Jeremy Grant, US Firms Lobby for Regulation by Principles, Financial Times, 
Sept. 16, 2007, http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto091520071714553553 (noting 
that Jamie Dimon, chief executive at JP Morgan Chase, and Dick Kovacevich, chairman of Wells 
Fargo, spearheaded an effort to lobby Washington to change the regulatory structure from a rules-
based system to a principles-based system because it would “improve the competitiveness of the 
capital markets”); Jenny Anderson, On Paper, Wall Street Gets Its Way, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/01/business/01wall.html?_r=1 (quoting Lehman Brothers 
CLO saying that he thought that the proposal for a principles-based system would be “a major step 
forward”). 
106 See Louis Kaplow, Rules v. Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 
559-60 (1992); See also Frederick Schauer, PLAYING BY THE RULES:  A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); 
Henry M. Hart & Albert M. Sacks, THE LEGAL PROCESS, 155-58 (1958); Pierre Schlag, Rules 
and Standards, 33 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 379 (1985); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in 
Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976). 
107 Kaplow, supra note 106, at 560. 
108 Almost all commentators seem to have used this example. See Kaplow, supra note 106 
at 559-61; Christie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities 
Regulation, 45 Am. Bus. L.J. 1, 6-8 (2008); Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the 
Rulification of Standards, 14 J. Contemp. Leg. Iss. 803, 803-04 (2005). 
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the rule. That is as simple as it can get, and the regulator, or fact-finder, need only 
find that the speed exceeded the limit and apply the penalty.  
In contrast, a speed limit crafted as a principle might simply prohibit 
driving at an excessive speed. This is even simpler to draft, but harder to apply. 
Now, the fact finder must examine the relevant circumstances, which could 
include many factors from weather to age, driving experience, and type of 
vehicle, in order to determine what speeds are excessive. Different conditions 
could yield different results. In addition, the fact finder would have to determine 
the actual speed and then apply the condition-based principle to that speed. Over 
time, one suspects that prosecutors, fearing reversal, might enforce the principle-
based prohibition only in more egregious cases. Empirical observers might report 
that prosecutions occurred only when some other factor (suspected drunk driving, 
extreme high speed, or reckless driving behavior) was observed. 
Clearly, the above described speed-limit rule is easier and less costly to 
enforce than its principle counterpart. Because it is easy to apply, it is often said 
to promote values like precision and certainty, equality and uniformity, and 
predictability and transparency.109 Transparency and certainty are maximized 
because the rule’s application leads to specific and known consequences.110 These 
factors, in turn effect the way in which regulators decide whether to enforce 
certain laws and how often.111 Clear and easy rules prompt easy, lower cost 
enforcement.112 
Still, these advantages are tempered by countervailing disadvantages. A 
rule, because it is certain, does not allow for flexibility or substantive equality.113 
It can be over- or under-inclusive, and can encourage behavior that is socially 
irresponsible up to the line it draws.114 In addition, when times change, rules may 
                                                 
109 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 106, at 1688 (noting that rules promote “restraint of 
official arbitrariness and certainty”). See also Schlag, supra note 106 at 384 (describing the 
argument that the “sharp line” drawn by rules promotes certainty and understandability). 
110 See, e.g., Kaplow supra note 106, at 563 (“Because learning about a rule is cheaper, 
individuals may spend less in learning about the law, and may be better guided by a rule since the 
law's content can be more readily ascertained.”). 
111 See, e.g., Kaplow supra note 106, at 563 (arguing that rules are cheaper to enforce 
because the majority of costs are borne during promulgation, whereas principles require additional 
costs for each instance of enforcement). 
112 See, e.g., Kaplow supra note 106, at 573 (arguing that rules become cheaper than 
standards as the frequency of enforcement increases). 
113 See, e.g., Schlag supra note 106, at 384-85 (describing how the “sharp line” drawn by 
rules may mete out seemingly disproportionate punishment). 
114 :  See, e.g., Kennedy supra note 106, at 1695 (noting that with rules, “sometimes 
perfectly innocent behavior will be punished, and that sometimes plainly guilty behavior will 
escape sanction”). See also Kaplow supra note 106, at 591 (noting that rules may prohibit socially 
acceptable behavior while failing to prohibit undesirable behavior). 
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need to change, but that process may be slow and costly, requiring in the case of 
administrative regulations, promulgation, debate, and revision.115  
In contrast, the speeding principle allows for flexibility.116 Here, if the 
fact-finder determines the weather and lighting were sufficient to allow a speed of 
70 miles per hour, then 70 it is. In alternative conditions, the allowed limit might 
be 50. Drivers face uncertainty, but gain the ability to adapt their behavior to 
changes in weather, car design, or circumstances. Further, a principle need not be 
redefined when circumstances change, because the principle incorporates adaptive 
flexibility upfront. 
To be sure, flexibility has its downsides. Neither those trying to abide by 
the law nor those doing the enforcing are certain what “it” is.117 Both have to 
assess and interpret the principle.118 The regulator then has to attempt to enforce 
its interpretation of the uncertain principle. Those with ample resources have 
greater incentive to contest the principle’s application to them. The result can be 
variation, more opportunities for manipulation and risky behavior, as well as 
increased enforcement costs as regulators struggle to define the inappropriate 
behavior and then enforce that standard on those who will argue the conduct was 
not within the intended definition.119 As the simple speeding example makes 
clear, this debate has multiple dimensions. Neither side wins, absolutely. The 
right choice of a rule-based or principle-based system depends on the 
circumstances. To the extent that a principle-based standard is more costly for the 
regulator to enforce and to the extent that the regulator is resource constrained, a 
principles-based system may result in less enforcement, lower penalties, and a 
larger de facto zone of regulatory immunity for those subject to it.  
Although the debate about rules and principles/standards often occurs as if 
the two never overlap, in reality they usually coexist.120 Indeed, the use of the 
term, “based,” as in “principles-based” or “rules-based” is illuminating. Most 
                                                 
115 See, e.g., Kaplow supra note 106, at 563 (noting that “rules are more costly to 
promulgate than standards because rules involve advance determinations of the law's content”). 
116 See, e.g., Kaplow supra note 106, at 560 (describing how “[a] standard may entail 
leaving both specification of what conduct is permissible and factual issues for the adjudicator”). 
117 See, e.g., Schlag supra note 106, at 385 (describing how the uncertainty surrounding 
standards may create “confusion about what is or is not permissible”). 
118 See, e.g., Schlag supra note 106, at 387 (describing how standards require evaluative 
judgments by subordinates which “increase the likelihood of erroneous determinations”). 
119 See, e.g., Schlag supra note 106, at 385 (describing the argument that with unclear 
standards, “decision makers in borderline cases are likely to reach erratic results”); see, e.g., 
Kaplow supra note 106, at 562–63 (noting that “standards are more costly for . . . enforcement 
authorities to apply because they require later determinations of the law's content”). 
120 See, e.g., Kennedy supra note 106; Kaplow supra note 106. 
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systems are really combinations of the two, with the major difference being the 
location of the system’s center of gravity in one or the other system.121  
The U.S. securities regime has obvious examples of both. Consider the 
types of financial disclosures required by Regulation S-K. This telephone book-
length regulation controls the disclosures that companies must make when 
seeking to offer securities to the public and when crafting the required annual 
reports. Regulation S-K operates by delineating specific required disclosures. 
Many of its provisions also contain specific materiality thresholds, or rules.122 But 
the certainty thereby afforded is undercut by Rule 12b-20 under the Securities 
Exchange Act, which obligates an issuer to disclose “in addition to the 
information expressly required to be included in a statement or report . . . such 
further additional material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the 
required statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made 
not misleading.”123 Thus, the SEC’s disclosure instructions backstop a series of 
rules with a general principle. Not surprisingly, the SEC likes to wear both a belt 
and suspenders. 
Now consider Item 404 of Regulation S-K.124 It requires disclosure of 
transactions exceeding $120,000 between the issuer and directors, officers, 5% 
stockholders (as well as the family members of those groups). It also requires 
disclosure of related entities in which these groups have an interest greater than 
10%, at least when 10% is the materiality threshold for this provision.125 Here, 
then, is an example of a precise disclosure rule. It is just one of many contained in 
the Regulation S-K, which is one of the most lengthy Regulations the SEC has 
promulgated.126  
A requirement like that contained in Item 404 is clear. Because it is clear, 
violations are more straightforward. Either a company discloses all of the required 
transactions or it does not. Straightforward violations are easier to prove. If the 
violation is easy to spot and prove, enforcing the regulation is also easy.127 Herein 
lies the rub. Industry might well want a principles-based system because it is more 
                                                 
121 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of 
“Principles-Based Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 Vand. 
L. Rev. 1411, 1413 (2007). 
122 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2008) (defining the materiality threshold of compensation 
information by enumerating a list of material elements of the compensation); 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 
(2008) (defining the materiality threshold of contracts that must be filed and disclosed with the 
registration statement to the SEC); 17 C.F.R. § 229.903 (2008) (defining, by an enumerated list, 
specific activities or events that constitute a “material risk” and should be reported in a disclosure 
statement to investors). 
123 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2008). 
124 17 C.F.R. § 229.404 (2008). 
125 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.404:6(b) (2008). 
126 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Joel Seligman, & Hillary A. Sale, Federal Securities Laws, 
Selected Statutes, Rules and Forms at 242-377 (2008). 
127 See Cunningham, supra note 121 at 1424. 
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difficult to enforce, and will, therefore, result in fewer enforcement actions.128 
Rest assured, however, that more is involved in the debate. The next issue is that 
of safe harbors.129 
Contrast Item 404 – a quintessential example of a rule-based system – 
with the way that industry has pressed for a safeharbor on the definition of 
materiality. Material misstatements or omissions can, of course, result in 
liability.130 The definition of the term “material,” thus determines when liability 
arises. According to the Supreme Court, the key question in this definition is 
whether a reasonable investor would care. Not all information is equal. 
Information is material, however, if there is a “substantial likelihood that [a] 
disclosure . . . would [be] viewed by [a] reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”131 This 
judicial definition is a principle. In order to determine whether a misstatement is 
material, you have to determine who the “reasonable” investor is, what 
information that investor would find significant, and what information 
appropriately constitutes the “total mix.” The result is uncertainty about the 
principle’s reach. 
Ironically, despite the vehement calls by industry for a shift to a 
principles-based securities regime, it has long and inconsistently fought the use of 
a principle for defining materiality, demanding instead a more specific “rule.”132 
The arguments it deploys focus on certainty and consistency.133 The business 
community wants a sharp-edged safe harbor so that it can make disclosure 
decisions free of liability concerns.134 In short, the argument for a rule-based 
approach to materiality is that industry needs to know for certain whether and 
                                                 
128 Jenny Anderson, On Paper, Wall Street Gets Its Way, N.Y. Times, April 1, 2008, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/01/business/01wall.html?scp=4&sq=principles-
based%20industry&st=cse (quoting former SEC commissioner Harvey J. Goldschmid as opining 
that some principles-based “advocates want broad principles that will not be enforced”). 
129 Safeharbors, or delineated protections, exist throughout the securities laws and 
regulations. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 78u-5(i)(A(B) (providing safeharbor protection for forward-
looking statements accompanied by meaningful cautionary language); Rule 10b5-1, Trading “on 
the Basis of” Material nonpublic Information in Insider Trading Cases, 17 C.F.R. 10b5-1 
(defining when certain purchases or sales of securities by an insider are exempt from insider 
trading liability). 
130 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008) (creating liability for purchasing or selling 
securities based upon material non-public information); TSC Ind., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 
445 (1976) (court states that liability may be conditioned upon material omissions of facts that a 
reasonable investor would have found important in deciding whether to invest). 
131 TSC Ind., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
132 See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) (rejecting industry's 
argument for a bright-line “agreement-in-principle” test to determine materiality). 
133 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 24, Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) 
(No. 86-279), 1987 WL 881061 (arguing that a rule would have “the benefits of certainty”). 
134 See, e.g., Basic supra note 29, at 236 (noting that support for a bright-line rule “seems 
to be directed solely at the comfort of corporate managers”). 
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when to disclose. The SEC135 and the courts136 have expressed a preference for a 
materiality principle, long declining to provide any bright-line rule and arguing 
that to do so would likely encourage risky behavior, right up to any threshold 
drawn.137  
If Item 404 provides the classic illustration of a rule, then Rule 10b-5 
provides an equally useful archetypal example of a principle-based regulation.138 
Rule 10b-5 supplies the jurisdictional basis for most securities litigation and the 
vast majority of the damages imposed on corporate issuers.139 For liability to 
attach under Rule 10b-5, there must be a material misstatement or omission, made 
with scienter, on which a person relies in purchasing or selling securities, and 
which causes the person damages.140 Scienter is the element receiving the greatest 
judicial attention. Case law interpreting it abounds. The issue is what level of state 
of mind speakers must have before they can be held responsible for an alleged 
material misstatement or omission.141  
Here again, industry has regularly called for reform and pushed for 
changes to increase certainty and predictability. In 1995, Congress responded with 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,142 which, among other changes, 
provided for “heightened pleading” of scienter-based claims.143 The reforms were 
designed to placate industry.144 The legislation resulted in significant increases in 
                                                 
135 SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (1999) (rejecting the use 
of a numerical threshold to determine materiality), available 
athttp://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm. 
136 See, e.g., Basic supra note 29, at 236 n. 14 (acknowledging the benefits of bright-line 
rules but dismissing the notion as “unrealistic”); see also In re Columbia Sec. Litig., 747 F. Supp. 
237, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the Supreme Court has endorsed a fact-specific test for 
materiality despite some advantages of a bright-line rule). 
137 See, e.g., Basic supra note 30, at 236 (“A bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow 
than a standard that requires the exercise of judgment in the light of all the circumstances. But ease 
of application alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the Securities Acts and Congress' 
policy decisions. Any approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always determinative 
of an inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or 
underinclusive.”). 
138 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. 
139 Coffee, Law and the Market,supra note 53  (arguing that actual financial sanctions 
imposed by private enforcement exceed those of public enforcement); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, 
LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 128 S. Ct. 761, 773 (2008) (referring to 10b-5 claim as “prominent 
feature of federal securities regulation”). See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard & Hillary A. Sale, What Counts 
as Fraud? An Empirical Study of Motions to Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act, 2 J. Emp. L.S. 125 (2005). 
140 See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976). [add citation to Dura 
Pharmaceutical] 
141 See Pritchard & Sale, supra note 139 at 129-130.  
142 See Ernst & Ernst at 197. 
143 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C.). 
144 See, e.g., Pritchard & Sale, supra note 139 at 126-127; Hillary A. Sale, Heightened 
Pleading and Discovery Stays:  An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information 
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the dismissal of claims at the pleading stage as well as a continuing battle over 
how to define scienter.145 After over a decade of litigation under the 1995 statute, 
the Supreme Court finally jumped into the fray, again in response to complaints 
about uncertainty.146 In 2007, the Court issued its Tellabs opinion that industry 
praised147 and touted as clarifying the standard, or making it more rule-like. 148  
But this praise may have been premature as the decision’s actual impact is 
less clear. Early decisions have produced results that likely have surprised 
industry. For example, on remand, the Seventh Circuit held in the Tellabs case 
that the complaint survived the new-improved, more rule-like standard.149 As a 
result, the case has now survived the motion to dismiss.150 Other cases have 
reached a similar result.151  A possible message of these decisions may well be 
that, under pressure, principles mutate into rules. That is, decision-makers try and 
reduce the uncertainty surrounding a principle, and, as they do so, it becomes 
easier to enforce – like the speed limit of 70 miles per hour.152   
What do we learn from these examples? First, it is obvious that 
straightforward rules tend to be easier to interpret and enforce. In part, the ease of 
enforcement of rules may well account for the industry’s preference for a 
principle-based system.153 Second, we learn that industry does not truly want a 
principles-based system without substantial qualifications and exemptions. 
Indeed, in some cases, industry has pushed for standards to migrate to the rule-
end of the spectrum.154 Presumably, any quick shift to a principle-based system 
would be accompanied by demands for bright-line rules in areas where litigation 
and enforcement tend to occur, like materiality or 10b-5 fraud claims. Third, then, 
                                                                                                                                     
Standard on ’33 and ’34 Act Claims, 76 Wash. U. L. Qtly. 537, 552-561 (discussing and citing 
legislative history and calls for reform). 
145See Pritchard & Sale, supra note 139; see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, 
Ltd. 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007).  
146 See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, 
Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007) (No. 06-484), 2006 WL 2849388 (arguing that the Supreme Court 
should resolve the “split of authority” regarding the “strong inference” standard). 
147 See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, Investors' Suits Face Higher Bar, Justices Rule, N.Y. 
Times, June 22, 2007, at A1 (noting industry praise for the Supreme Court’s heightened standard 
in Tellabs). 
148 See, e.g., Press Release, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, 
Tellabs Case:  Supreme Court Hands Industry 2nd Major Victory in 2 Weeks (June 21, 2007) 
(arguing that the ruling “lends certainty and uniformity” to the standard), available at 
http://www.sifma.org/news/46739784.shtml. 
149 Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008). 
150 Id. 
151 Mississippi Public Employees’ Retirement Sys. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 523 F.3d 
753 (1st Cir. 2008) (reversing district court dismissal and finding scienter adequately pleaded 
under Tellabs). 
152 See Schauer, supra note 106, at 809–11 (arguing that decision-makers push standards 
into rule-like form). 
153 See Anderson, On Paper, Wall Street Gets Its Way, supra note 92. 
154 On the migration of standards to rules from the perspective of decision-makers, see 
Schauer, supra note 106, at 809–11. 
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it appears that industry’s real interest is in a hybrid system. Yet, as we have just 
seen, the U.S. disclosure regime is just that, a combination of rules and principles. 
It is not alone. Most other systems, regardless of how they are touted, are also 
hybrids.155  
All this suggests that movement in either direction along the 
rules/principles continuum is unlikely to provide any quick or easy fix to the U.S. 
securities regime. Scrapping the entire system in favor of a new-and-improved 
principles system would create uncertainty, not only because it was principles-
based, but also because it would be new. Indeed, a new system might well create 
at least a short-term litigation boon, as lawyers attempted to “prosecute” cases 
under the revised principles-based system.  
Here, under the system of contingent fee motivated entrepreneurial 
litigation that the U.S. has long and uniquely accepted, private attorneys can and 
do obtain very large settlements in the course of enforcing the securities laws and 
regulations.156 Industry presumably does not want an increase in such actions or 
settlements, particularly when accompanied by a concomitant increase in 
uncertainty about new principles. Thus, any discussions about reforms to the U.S. 
system must include consideration of the environment in which securities 
disclosure takes place and in which it is enforced. Our system emphasizes ex post 
adjudication of fraud issues, chiefly through private securities litigation based on 
Rule 10b-5 and a few other implied private causes of action.157 Although there 
have been many proposals for reform and virtually everyone supports some 
reform in principle,158 no specific proposal has yet achieved broad support. 
Our concern is that any significant movement towards a truly principles-
based regulatory model will aggravate existing problems with private litigation. 
Unless greater attention is given to the impact of these proposals on civil 
litigation, the “solution” may well be worse than the “problem.” Here, the 
Blueprint appears to fall short. Although it states various broad themes, it neither 
addresses seriously the problems of consumer-protection, nor does it explain how 
the principles-based regime would provide industry the protections it seeks. Good 
                                                 
155 See Ford supra note 108. 
156 See Laura E. Simmons & Ellen M. Ryan, Securities Class Action Settlements: 2006 
Review and Analysis,  Cornerstone Research (2006) at 1, 
http://www.cornerstone.com/pdf/practice_securities/2006Settlements.pdf (showing that Enron 
settled for $7.1 billion, Worldcom settled for $6.2 billion, and Cendant Corp settled for $3.1 
billion). 
157 Historically, the implied private cause of action arose under Rule 14a-9, which 
addresses fraud in proxy statements. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) 
(noting that private securities litigation is a “necessary supplement to Commission action”). 
158 See, e.g., Letter to Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher Cox 
and Attached Questions and Issues for Discussion (Aug. 2, 2007) (on file with authors) 
[hereinafter Letter to SEC] (noting diversity of signors and urging Commission to address 
concerns about investor protection, competitiveness, and litigation system; signed by Donald C. 
Langevoort, James D. Cox, Jill Fisch, Michael A. Perino, Adam C. Pritchard, Hillary A. Sale). 
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reform requires precisely that sort of attention, with a clearer focus on the U.S. 
public and private enforcement environments, the role of class actions, and the 
high level of retail ownership in the United States.159  
If one recognizes that the goal of consumer protection must be balanced 
against the goal of reducing abusive litigation,160 that balancing quickly becomes 
exceedingly complex. Precisely for this reason, the tradeoffs in any reforms 
should be explicit. One such tradeoff might be to determine whether industry 
would prefer to refashion the ex ante, rule-based disclosure requirements into a 
more principle-based system, with the ex post litigation enforcement provisions 
remaining in place. Although that might mean that consumers would receive less 
specific information about a particular company upfront, consumers would still 
have an ex post principle-based enforcement remedy. Conceivably, we could trim 
the Regulation S-K rules and refashion many of them as principles, enforceable 
through a general anti-fraud prohibition that relied on a broad “principles-based” 
definition of materiality. Industry would gain a principle-based disclosure system, 
subject to ex post litigation and enforcement. We doubt, however, that such a 
system would quickly gain a consensus of support. 
Suffice it to say that these types of tradeoffs may explain why there are 
cyclical debates about massive systemic reform, but only infrequent changes of 
any consequence.161 As history reveals, politics intervenes.162 The result is fewer 
changes than debates.163  
Part IV:  The Role of Self-Regulation 
U.S. securities regulation is generally thought to promote a liquid and 
efficient capital market.164 Part of its legitimacy comes from its enforcement 
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system. Though many have debated whether U.S. enforcement, and in particular 
private securities litigation, is excessive, all that can clearly be shown is that 
enforcement is better funded and more rigorous in the United States than 
elsewhere, not that it is excessive.165 Indeed, as Part II of this paper makes clear, 
the United States has recently weathered a series of corporate frauds that do not 
suggest that corporate decision-makers have been overdeterred. Any arguments 
for reform, then, should fully address these issues. The Blueprint does not.  
Despite the range of industry and gatekeeping failures documented in Part 
II of this article, the Blueprint offers three proposals tied to regulation and 
enforcement, which, to varying degrees, seek to allow industry to self-regulate 
and seemingly will decrease enforcement. First, as discussed in Part III, the 
Treasury Report urges a regulatory system based on core principles, but, as just 
argued, a principles-based system will likely decrease enforcement. Second, the 
Treasury Report urges preemption of state securities enforcement. State securities 
regulators, however, have been important fraud detectors and arbitrators, who 
have, at times created competition pressuring the SEC to take action.166 Third, the 
Treasury Report asserts that the “ideal” regime would be one in which the federal 
government’s role in fraud enforcement would diminish dramatically and the self-
regulatory organizations, themselves public companies, would become the 
enforcers and consumer protectors.167  
To examine these proposals, it is important to focus more concretely on 
what exactly would be delegated and to whom. Under the Blueprint, the 
disclosure system currently in place would continue to be managed by a federal 
body, the Corporate Financial Regulator.168 Thus, on some level, the consumer 
protection afforded by the disclosure side of the system would remain in place.  
Still, our mandatory disclosure system has long co-existed with a strong 
anti-fraud rule. Disclosures must not be misleading, either affirmatively or by 
half-truth or omission.169 Most recognize that fraud in the marketplace has 
significant costs.170 Policing the market for fraud is thus important in order to 
                                                                                                                                     
markets with those of other countries and showing how much more liquid the U.S. capital markets 
are). 
165 See, e.g., Pritchard & Sale, supra note 139, at 126 (noting “dearth” of empirical work 
on securities litigation reform); see also Coffee, Law and the Market, supra note 53, at 258-263 
(showing greater enforcement “output” in U.S. versus other major market centers); Stavros 
Gadinis & Howell E. Jackson, Markets as Regulators:  A Survey, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1239 (2007) 
(studying international enforcement regimes). 
166 Treasury Report, supra note 14, at 179–80. 
167 Treasury Report, supra note 14, at 178–79. 
168 Treasury Report, supra note 14, at 21. 
169 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths:  Protecting Mistaken Inferences by 
Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87, 117 (1999). (explaining that both courts and SEC 
regulators require people to “volunteer any … information necessary to make [their statements] 
not misleading” to avoid being liable in fraud-on-the-market cases). 
170 These costs have been thoroughly explored elsewhere and here are discussed only 
briefly. 
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promote consumer protection, liquidity and efficiency. In short, punishing fraud 
allows for “public confidence” in the market.171 Shareholders and other market 
monitors can make accurate investment decisions only if disclosures are 
sufficiently fulsome and truthful.172 Fraud, of course, interferes with such 
assessments and, thereby, decreases the accountability of managers.173 In 
addition, over time, as markets become unreliable, shareholders will decline to 
invest or will demand a higher premium because of the market’s tolerance of 
fraud. When that occurs, liquidity decreases,174 and the cost of capital likely 
increases.175 Of course, excessive deterrence may also reduce market efficiency 
by leading corporate managers to be overly cautious in their forward-looking 
statements or even to understate income. 
Thus, from either perspective, fraud must be punished, but neither too 
much nor too little, because serious errors are possible in both directions. When 
courts or the SEC approach this issue of damage assessment, they usually analyze 
the topic from one of two alternative perspectives:  compensation or deterrence.176 
In actual reality, compensation is only minimally achieved in today’s enforcement 
and litigation world, and arguably properly so.177 Deterrence is also an elusive 
target, but it can be imposed in two forms:  through actual payment of civil 
damages or other enforcement penalties or through litigation and its associated 
costs. The Blueprint sidesteps the issue of private litigation, stating only that 
                                                 
171 Dura Pharmaceuticals, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005). 
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“implied private rights of action” are for the courts to determine.178 Further, 
although much recent academic commentary has stressed the likely superiority of 
public enforcement over private enforcement,179 the Blueprint takes precisely the 
opposite approach, attacking, first, state and, then, federal enforcement, and 
proposing to minimize both through delegation to the SROs. 
The Blueprint’s assault on state enforcement is straightforward: It should 
be preempted.180 This suggestion is not new.181 Industry has repeatedly urged 
preemption of state securities law and enforcement.182 In fact, in 1997, NSMIA 
did preempt much of the states’ securities regulatory apparatus for securities 
traded in national markets, but it left state anti-fraud enforcement largely intact.183 
In contrast, the Blueprint focuses not on state regulation in the sense of 
rule-making and oversight, but on state enforcement of antifraud rules. 
Increasingly, state Attorneys General have played an aggressive role in 
prosecuting securities fraud and have pushed the SEC to be more vigorous in its 
own enforcement efforts.184 The Blueprint’s proposal, however, would preclude 
the New York Attorney General’s office from playing the central role that it 
recently has. In support of such preemption, the Blueprint notes that the “current 
multi-agency business conduct oversight structure creates uneven enforcement, 
potential enforcement gaps, disputes over jurisdiction, and regulatory 
inconsistency.”185 All that may be to some degree true, but such “multi-agency 
oversight” also produces competition, which in turn leads to more aggressive 
enforcement and fills gaps. Recent experience suggests that this is a form of 
regulatory competition that actually appears to have worked. If one believes 
securities fraud tends to be underenforced, competition is desirable and creates a 
                                                 
178 Treasury Report, supra note 14, at 119. Interestingly, at several other points the 
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ed. 2007) (discussing role of Eliot Spitzer in Enron investigations and prosecutions). 
185 Treasury Report, supra note 14, at 172. 
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failsafe check and balance against the prospect of regulatory capture. Even if one 
believes the reverse, automatic preemption does not logically follow.186 
Part II has already noted that then Attorney General Eliot Spitzer was 
ahead of the SEC in the investigation of securities analyst conflicts and “market 
timing” in mutual funds. The same can be said for the Enron investigation, where 
he used New York’s unusually flexible securities law to investigate the role of the 
investment banks in the Enron fraud.187 By all accounts, he was once again “out in 
front of” the SEC and his investigations created pressure on the SEC to enter the 
battle and insist on a settlement by the banks.188 Indeed, at the time of Spitzer’s 
investigation, it was unclear whether the SEC intended to pursue the banks at all, 
let alone aggressively.189  
This phenomenon of the New York Attorney General stealing a march on 
the SEC is not limited to the brief reign of Eliot Spitzer. More recently, his 
successor, Andrew Cuomo, has been the most aggressive enforcer in the recent 
auction rate securities cases, negotiating settlements with the major investment 
banks totaling well over $50 billion.190 Earlier, Attorney General Cuomo reached 
the first settlements with the credit rating agencies.191 Other Attorneys General 
have also played a significant role, along with the SEC, in resolving similar these 
cases.192 
Not only have the State Attorneys General frequently been first, they have 
often been tougher. A recent study of the restitution involved in mutual fund cases 
is particularly revealing.193 It compares restitution in cases involving both the 
New York Attorney General’s office and the SEC, with those involving the SEC 
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alone.194 The study concluded that the cases with both “prosecutors” yielded 
considerably higher restitution ratios.195 The study controlled for a variety of 
factors to reach the conclusion that the higher restitution in the cases with the 
New York Attorney General appear to be attributable to its relative 
aggressiveness.196 Further, the study concludes that the “aggressiveness 
explanation” is consistent with the career concerns of the regulator as well as with 
regulatory capture theories.197 
Under the system proposed by the Blueprint, the most that a State 
Attorney General could do, if so inclined, would be to “suggest” an investigation, 
or at least raise the question of one, with the various federal regulators and self-
regulatory bodies. It could proceed further, however, only with their approval.198  
The Blueprint also neglects to address the incentives of state regulators to 
pursue such violations.  The Zitzewitz study, however, makes clear that 
accounting for those incentives is important.199 Career concerns and the favorable 
publicity that accompanies such investigations appear to motivate (at least in part) 
the decision to pursue them.200 Despite this fact, the Blueprint proposes that state 
regulators be urged instead only to investigate and bring questions to the attention 
of the federal regulators. Then, they should be content with walking away when 
they are preempted from carrying the investigation through. Yet, as the Enron and 
market-timing cases make clear, the state regulators have been important gap-
fillers in the existing system, with the competition benefitting the investors and 
the market.   
This does not mean that regulatory competition between state and federal 
enforcers never produces problems or inconsistencies. But when it does, the more 
politically accountable approach would be to force the SEC to take public action 
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to preempt the state regulator. This both has political costs for the SEC (as it 
should have) and adds transparency to the process. To simply assume that the 
SEC would always resist state enforcement and desire its preemption seems an 
extraordinarily arbitrary presumption. Thus, we will suggest an alternative 
mechanism for resolving actual conflicts between state and federal enforcers in 
the concluding section of this article. 
Next, let us consider the distinct proposal of the Blueprint that most power 
held by the SEC be delegated to the SROs. Despite an extraordinary recent 
outpouring of criticism over the failure of the gatekeepers,201 the Blueprint never 
even addresses this topic or the alleged enforcement capacity of the SROs. Nor 
does it address the SRO failures that led the U.K. to replace self-regulation with 
the FSA.202 Instead, in support for the proposal to shift responsibility to the 
SROS, the Treasury Report offers the following bland paragraph: 
A number of models could be considered to implement CBRA’s rule 
writing, compliance, and enforcement responsibilities. CBRA could 
employ a model, similar to the current approach in banking regulation, 
under which it would be solely responsible for these functions. However, 
given CBRA’s scope of responsibilities, that structure would not likely be 
practical. CBRA could also employ, or in some instances be required to 
employ, a structure similar to the current futures and securities regime that 
relies on SROs for many aspects of regulatory implementation and 
oversight. Given the breadth and scope of CBRA’s responsibilities, some 
aspect of self-regulation should form an important component of 
implementation. Given its significance and effectiveness, the current SRO 
model for futures and securities should be preserved. That model could be 
considered for other areas, or the structure could be flexible enough to 
allow for certain modifications, such as maintaining rule writing authority 
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with CRBA, while relying on an SRO model for compliance and 
enforcement.203 
The key rationale offered here for shifting enforcement to the SROs 
appears to be the “breadth and scope of CBRA’s responsibilities.” If workload is 
the problem, the logical answer would be to increase the staff and resources of the 
federal agency, not to shift responsibility from a public enforcer to a private one. 
Other than workload and a vague claim about the need to achieve 
convergence,204 the Blueprint is devoid of a rationale for why the SROs should 
absorb enforcement or, more importantly, why they would be good at it. Given 
that fraud, or more properly, the lack thereof, is so important to the marketplace, 
the question is a serious one.205 As Part III has emphasized, the recent experience 
of the U.S. with an unparalleled level of fraud only adds to the importance of 
making the right enforcement decision – and for the right reasons.206 
The Blueprint’s silence on this question does not imply that serious 
arguments could not be made in favor of greater reliance on SROs.207 To consider 
these, let’s begin with an initial question:  who are the SROs? The Blueprint 
defines them to include the exchanges and the self-regulatory bodies for brokers 
and dealers (now FINRA). Today, each exchange or market has its own set of 
rules and regulations with which listed companies must comply.208 In 2007, the 
NASD was consolidated with the listed company regulation, enforcement, and 
arbitration functions of the New York Stock Exchange, resulting in FINRA. 
According to FINRA’s website, 
FINRA touches virtually every aspect of the securities business—from 
registering and educating industry participants to examining securities 
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firms; writing rules; enforcing those rules and the federal securities laws; 
informing and educating the investing public; providing trade reporting 
and other industry utilities; and administering the largest dispute 
resolution forum for investors and registered firms. It also performs 
market regulation under contract for The NASDAQ Stock Market, the 
American Stock Exchange, the International Securities Exchange and the 
Chicago Climate Exchange.209 
Thus, it is fair to say that the key SROs are the exchanges, and FINRA, and 
arguably the PCAOB, which serves as the SRO for auditing firms.210  
Next, the more difficult and critical issue involves whether the SROs can 
be effective enforcers against their own listed companies.211 The SRO listed 
company rules are not particularly textured. Instead, they tend to be of a check-
the-box nature – i.e., classic “rules” with no hint of principles lurking beneath the 
surface. For example, although both NASDAQ and NYSE/Euronext require some 
committees of listed companies’ boards to be composed solely of independent 
directors, the definitions of independence are based on narrow and highly specific 
financial criteria.212 More fulsome disclosure might be warranted, but the listing 
rules do not require it.  
More importantly, exchanges are businesses. In theory, they have an 
interest in creating rules and listing standards to attract investors.213 Attracting 
investors attracts listed companies.214 As economic actors, then, exchanges should 
understand that market integrity is important “in attracting business.”215 
Companies want to list on efficient markets where they are likely to attract 
investors.216 Again, in theory, these basic interests could, over time, lead the 
SROs to develop rules and regulations to prevent fictitious transactions and 
securities, as well as fraud and other types of market manipulation. Hopefully, the 
SROs would want to promulgate regulations that promote their own reputations 
and, thereby, garner business.  The fact that today there are two highly 
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competitive U.S. exchanges enhances this argument – competition should 
encourage the development of efficient regulations.217  
Arguably, the exchanges might also have some advantages in rulemaking. 
They are close to the market and have informational advantages that the 
government does not have.218 They would certainly have the opportunity to 
develop regulations based on the information to which they have access and, in 
particular, with respect to how the markets work. Perhaps relying on this view of 
SRO’s advantages, the Blueprint urges that all SRO proposed rules be self-
certifying, rather than subject to the check and, arguably, balance, of government 
approval.219 
These are fairly straightforward economic arguments that have been made 
many times before. But there are complications. For example, the arguments for 
why exchanges and SROs make superior regulators sound much like the 
arguments that used to be made for why gatekeepers never fail. Indeed, over time, 
the more sophisticated proponents of SRO regulation have come to place less 
emphasis on the investor protection side of the SROs’ regulatory function and 
more on their need to attract listings.220 Further, today, even strong advocates of 
eliminating some aspects of SEC rulemaking functions and private class actions 
continue to stress public enforcement provisions.221 
Perhaps the most important complication is that both the NYSE/Euronext 
and NASDAQ are now public companies. Public companies face issues that 
complicate their decision-making in ways that arguably make them ineffective 
compliers, let alone regulators. Now add to that, under the Blueprint’s scheme, 
that they would truly be self-regulating. They would set regulations, and enforce 
them, for themselves and for their listed companies. The conflict of interest is 
patent and is akin to the old adage of the “fox guarding the henhouse.”  
In addition, the economic arguments in favor of having the SROs take on 
these responsibilities rely significantly on reputation and market forces. Yet, these 
factors may be generally less effective than assumed. As Marcel Kahan has 
argued, exchanges have limited incentives to expose “bad” information about 
                                                 
217 In today’s world, although the exchanges and markets have their own listing 
standards, FINRA now occupies the enforcement field for both NASDAQ and NYSE/Euronext. 
Thus, the competition argument is debatable for enforcement purposes. See Pritchard, supra note 
172, at _. 
218 See Paul Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, supra note 179, at 1498 (stating that 
the benefits of allowing the exchanges do the rulemaking outweigh the drawbacks because of the 
exchanges superior knowledge about investors). 
219 Blueprint, supra note 14, at 116. 
220 See Pritchard, supra note 172, at 964; Steven C. Pirrong, A Positive Theory of 
Financial Exchange Organization with Normative Implications for Financial Market Regulation 
(1998), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=10598. 
221 See Pritchard, supra note at 172; Mahoney, supra note 218. 
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their listed companies.222 Information that casts the exchange in a negative light 
will harm its ability to attract investors and other companies.223 If they have little 
interest in disclosing their own problems, they will presumably have little 
incentive to ferret information out in the first place.224 Thus, the reputational and 
market forces cut both ways here – particularly with respect to enforcement.  
Exchange-based enforcement may not be effective for other reasons as 
well. Listing is voluntary. Listed companies who are dissatisfied have choices 
(indeed that is part of the rationale for the Blueprint’s recommendations). An 
obvious choice is to select a different exchange and with it a different regulatory 
body, including a non-U.S. exchange and a non-U.S. regulator. This fear of the 
foreign migration of listed companies may well create an incentive for the 
exchanges, which are public companies themselves, from enforcing their 
regulations aggressively. Yet, the social loss from “soft” regulation may exceed 
the gains from attracting more listings. Investors may lose precisely as the 
investment banks gain.225 
In addition, because the SEC regulates many aspects of securities law, not 
just those concerning the listed companies themselves, delegation to SROs 
implicates the interests of third parties. To begin with an obvious fact, the SEC 
has the power to regulate and sanction acts beyond those of listed companies and 
members.226 For example, in 2007, the SEC preempted the exchanges from 
adopting an “uptick” rule to regulate short selling, and in 2008 the SEC has 
proposed regulations on “naked short selling.” Such regulations focus on traders 
who are not necessarily exchange members (e.g., institutional investors, hedge 
funds, etc.). Today, the exchanges no longer have effective power to control these 
aspects of securities regulation. It seems a fair question to ask whether it would be 
desirable to delegate power over these third parties to a public company that is 
being regulated by itself. Arguably it could have an incentive to prevent any sort 
of short-selling or speculative trading at all. The very concept of delegating such a 
dramatic level of responsibility to a public company with a board focused on its 
                                                 
222 Marcel Kahan, Some Problems with Stock Exchange-Based Securities Regulation, 83 
Va. L. Rev. 1509, 1518 (1997) (arguing that stock exchanges have an interest in portraying a 
favorable image to the investing public and therefore have little incentive to search for and 
disclose violations of companies listed on their exchanges). 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
225 From the standpoint of market professionals, “soft” regulation that makes limited use 
of enforcement may imply more transactions, more listings and offerings, and a higher volume of 
business – all maximizing the revenues of market professionals. Similarly, foreign issuers may 
prefer and migrate to a soft regulatory system, even if it implies a higher cost of capital, because it 
permits their controlling shareholders to retain greater private benefits of control. Domestic 
investors, however, can expect that weak regulation and a disinclination to utilize enforcement 
sanctions implies both that greater private benefits will be extracted and that firms in this market 
will have a higher cost of capital. See Coffee, Law and the Market, supra note 53, at 237 and 311. 
226 See Mahoney, supra note 218, at 1498. 
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own earnings, raises questions about outsourcing that deserve very serious 
discussion. The Blueprint, however, ignores these issues entirely.  
Finally, today, the exchanges target their enforcement efforts less at public 
companies and more on broker-dealers. FINRA, the combined enforcement body 
for NYSE/Euronext and NASDAQ is not, therefore, a “complete” enforcer. 
Instead, it tends to occupy the broker/dealer field, leaving the other matters to the 
SEC. Arguably, then, the SEC and FINRA have reached an efficient division of 
labor that allows for specialization. Shifting the responsibility to the SROs 
eliminates this division of labor and puts industry in charge of itself.  
In sum, without any rationale other than CBRA’s workload, the Blueprint 
suggests broad elimination of SEC and state-level enforcement powers in favor of 
letting the regulated enforce against themselves. Yet, the exchanges currently rely 
upon governmental assistance and the government’s power to deter fraud.227 
Unquestionably, the exchanges would like the SEC to listen to their point of view 
more attentively, and probably the SEC should be pushed to expedite its review of 
proposed SRO rules (which has been a long-standing source of tension between 
the SROs and the SEC but which it has promised to do). But regulations alone do 
not a sufficient anti-fraud regime make. Instead, fraud-prevention requires 
deterrence. Deterrence requires detection, and detection requires detectives with 
the incentive to achieve outcomes. The current system is one of tripartite 
enforcement – the exchanges do some, the SEC does some, and the states provide 
valuable back up.228 The backup is key, because it provides a failsafe control 
against regulatory capture. Although the exchanges may be able to play some role 
here, hardcore fraud requires the intervention of an outsider.229 The Blueprint, 
however, would replace the outsider with self-regulation by insiders. 
Part V: Consolidation and Coordination 
Although we have been to this point critical of the Blueprint for its 
unsupported faith in self-regulation and the natural superiority of principles over 
rules, those aspects of the Blueprint are essentially peripheral. Its core 
contribution is to call forcefully for consolidation within a system of financial 
regulation that is fragmented to the point of Balkanization. Moreover, the 
Blueprint also makes an astute judgment in preferring a “twin peaks” or multiple 
agency regulatory structure that places consumer protection, business conduct, 
and disclosure regulation under one regulatory authority and traditional prudential 
financial oversight (i.e., “safety and soundness” regulation) under another.230 In 
                                                 
227 See also Mahoney, supra note 218, at 1499; Pritchard, supra note 172 at 976–77. 
228 See Pritchard, supra note 172, at 976–77. 
229 See Pritchard, supra note 172, at 976–77. 
230 The Blueprint actually proposes a tripartite model with a “market stability” regulator, 
a “prudential financial” regulator, and a “business conduct” regulator. See Blueprint at 13–14. 
Effectively, once one translates these terms into the current organizational environment, this 
means that the Federal Reserve would not be consolidated with the Office of the Controller of the 
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effect, the Treasury Department has followed Australia, rather than the U.K. – and 
wisely so. One unified regulator, which is the U.K. model, places too many 
responsibilities under one regulator, thereby masking the conflicts that can arise 
between consumer protection and maintenance of bank solvency and soundness. 
But if what one accepts the superiority of the “twin peaks” model, that still 
leaves open the question of how regulatory authority should be allocated between 
the two agencies. Specifically, assume that the Blueprint is influential and, acting 
upon it, some future Administration resolves to pursue a “twin peaks” model that 
assigns the SEC authority over disclosure, business conduct and consumer 
protection, but gives some amalgam of the OCC and the Federal Reserve 
authority over the safety and soundness of financial institutions. What 
responsibilities might still migrate from one agency to the other? In Part A below, 
we recommend that “prudential” regulatory authority over all financial 
institutions be consolidated in the Federal Reserve/OCC successor. As the agency 
which ultimately must fund bailouts for troubled financial institutions, it has the 
best incentives to protect bank safety and soundness. As a practical matter, this 
means that the SEC would largely surrender its authority to administer its “net 
capital rule” and would instead look to the Federal Reserve to restrict excessive 
leverage at investment banks, mutual funds, and hedge funds. 
Part B addresses the problem of enforcement competition. Although we 
have argued that state regulators should be encouraged and not preempted from 
securities fraud enforcement, we recognize that a point can be reached where one 
state regulator could take action under antifraud rules that did conflict with 
important federal regulatory policies. Still, rather than preempt all state regulators 
ex ante because of this potential conflict, we propose an alternative, and more 
limited policy in Part B below that would apply on an ex post basis only. 
A. Prudential Financial Regulation: Not the SEC’s Job 
The SEC has administered its net capital rules from the agency’s outset.231 
Why should it abandon this authority to banking regulators? Our answer is two 
fold: (1) times have changed, and (2) banking regulators have the comparative 
advantage because they focus on precisely these issues of risk and leverage over a 
broad range of financial institutions.  
Times have changed in several critical respects:  First, as earlier discussed, 
the major investment banks have either failed, merged with commercial banks, or 
reconstituted themselves as bank holding companies. Today, most large broker 
                                                                                                                                     
Currency, as well as that the SEC would not be merged into a unified financial regulator. We do 
not address the specific form of consolidation that should occur among banking regulators. 
231 Federal net capital standards for broker dealers have been administered by the SEC 
since its inception in 1934, and the precursor of the current net capital rules, which are predicated 
on Section 15(c)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, dates back to 1938. See L. Loss and J. 
Seligman, SECURITIES REGULATION (3rd ed. 1991) at 3128-3133. Rule 15c3-1 dates from 
1975. 
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dealers are part of a larger financial conglomerate, and their risk management 
activities, capital adequacy, and operational status can be meaningfully 
understood only on a consolidated, entity-wide basis. Indeed, the SEC recognized 
this fact in 2004 when it put into place its “consolidated supervised entity” (CSE) 
framework, which allowed broker-dealers and their holding companies to 
voluntarily elect to be subject to SEC supervision with respect to capital adequacy 
on a group-wide basis.232 The SEC recently abandoned the CSE program, 
conceding its failure,233 and others have viewed it as an instance of regulatory 
capture.234 
The real issue for the future involves not investment banks, but hedge 
funds and insurance companies, which are not seriously regulated at the federal 
level today, but are similarly capable of destabilizing the financial system (as AIG 
has surely proven). We propose that the regulatory consolidation give the Federal 
Reserve authority to monitor and restrict the leverage of all financial institutions 
that are “too big to fail.” 
Second, the issue that most threatens the solvency of financial institutions 
involves the explosive growth of over-the-counter derivatives, and in particular 
credit default swaps.235 Bear Stearns was bailed out by the Federal Reserve, not 
because it was too big to fail, but because it was too entangled to fail. It had 
issued billions of dollars worth of credit default swaps, and its failure could 
conceivably have set off a cascade of falling financial dominoes. 
But if the growth of derivatives is the key weakness, the SEC is poorly 
positioned to address or resolve this problem. Under Section 3A of the Securities 
Exchange Act, the SEC is broadly denied authority over swap agreements in 
sweeping language that even denies the SEC the ability to “recommend” or 
“suggest” registration of derivatives236 or to impose “reporting or recordkeeping 
requirements.”237 While the SEC has hesitated and even resisted greater 
regulation of swaps, the Federal Reserve has consistently sought the 
                                                 
232 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 49, 830, (“Alternative Net Capital 
Requirement for Broker-Dealers that Are Part of Consolidated Supervised Entities”) (June 8, 
2004), 69 Fed. Reg. 34, 428. 
233 Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Entities Program (Sept. 
26, 2008) available at  http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-230.htm (quoting Chairman 
Cox as saying that “voluntary regulation does not work”). 
234  Stephen Labaton, Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk, New 
York Times (Oct. 3, 2008) available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/business/03sec.html?hp=&pagewanted=print, 
235 See Press Release, Int’l Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n, Inc., Mid-Year 2008 Market 
Survey Shows Credit Derivatives at $54.6 Trillion (Sept. 24, 2008), available at 
http://www.isda.org/press/press092508.html (noting that the annual growth rate for credit 
derivatives from mid-2007 to mid-2008 was 20 percent). 
236 See Section 3A(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78c-1(b)(2). 
237 See Section 3A(b)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78c-1(b)(3). 
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establishment of an industry-wide clearing house for the trading of over-the-
counter derivatives.238 
Third, banking regulators have the comparative advantage in this area. 
Capital adequacy regulation, including the supervision of risk management, is the 
core business of banking regulators. In the post-Basel II environment, their 
personnel are highly trained in the latest techniques. The SEC is fundamentally a 
disclosure regulator. As a result, it is questionable whether it has a sufficient 
number of trained personnel to engage in in-depth oversight of capital adequacy. 
Inherently too, the SEC will always have a “bottoms up” perspective, looking 
through the regulated broker-dealer to its parent financial holding company, 
whereas banking regulators have the superior “top down” perspective. 
Fourth, it is open to question whether capital adequacy regulation would 
ever become a major priority for the SEC. By culture and philosophy, the SEC is 
a disclosure regulator, whose concerns with risk and leverage are generally 
satisfied once full disclosure is made.  
For the future, it seems obvious that financial regulators will need to 
restrict leverage and risky trading practices at investment banks and other large 
financial institutions. The agency best suited to accomplish this task is not the 
SEC. Banking regulators have better skilled personnel (and more of them), better 
information (acquired from their regulatory oversight of commercial banks and 
other financial institutions), and greater power over their regulated institutions. 
This does not mean that the SEC should be stripped of all power in this regard,239 
and certainly the SEC should be consulted by the prudential regulator. But the 
primary responsibility for determining capital adequacy should be given to the 
prudential regulator, as the body with the greater experience and superior 
resources. 
B. State/Federal Relationships in a Competitive Environment 
We have earlier argued that competition among enforcers is healthy and 
has filled gaps in securities enforcement. But limits may need to be placed on this 
competition. Consider a circumstance that briefly arose during New York 
                                                 
238 Joanne Morrison, Fed’s Kohn sees DCS clearinghouse risks, benefits, Reuters, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/gc06/idUSN1962224820080619 (Jun. 19, 2008) (discussing role of 
New York Fed in establishing clearinghouse); Allan van Duyn et al., Plans for Central Clearing 
House for Derivatives, Financial Times, July 31, 2008, available at 
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239 Today, there are an estimated 8,000 broker-dealer firms registered with the SEC. Of 
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Attorney General Spitzer’s settlement negotiations with Merrill Lynch and other 
investment banks over conflicts of interest surrounding securities analysts. For a 
time, Mr. Spitzer was convinced that the only appropriate remedy was a 
prophylactic rule under which investment banks that underwrote securities would 
be barred from employing securities analysts. The investment banks would 
therefore be required to spin off or sell their research divisions to firms that did 
not underwrite securities. Although the New York Attorney General was basically 
armed only with a antifraud statute, that statute was liberally phrased and carried 
criminal penalties.240 The pressure of high potential liability can coerce a 
defendant to agree to virtually any non-pecuniary terms that reduced its financial 
or criminal liability. Here, the financial industry’s fears are not without some 
basis in fact. 
To be sure, the point here is not the dubious wisdom of the above 
described prophylactic rule (which ultimately the New York Attorney General 
abandoned as ill-considered). Rather, it is that one state jurisdiction, if adamant, 
might be able to impose terms and conditions that adversely impacted on the 
national market. If the SEC did not want to compel the spin off of all securities 
research and New York State did, the SEC’s judgment should control. To ensure 
that the SEC retains this power, we would favor legislation authorizing the SEC to 
take action ex post to invalidate any rule, regulation or order made by a state 
securities regulator, or any provision in a settlement between state regulators and 
defendants, that in the SEC’s judgment unreasonably restrained competition, 
interfered with fair and orderly markets, impeded the national market system, or 
was contrary to the public interest or the protection of investors.241 This power is 
broad, but would not be unlimited. Most importantly, it would be an ex post 
power, not a general prohibition on rule making or litigation. The SEC would, 
however, be required to notify the state regulator and the market of its rationale 
                                                 
240 See Coffee, Seligman, & Sale, supra note 184 at 1277–78 discussing broad reach of 
Martin Act and Spitzer’s use of it.  See also Mike McIntire, Two Views of a Rising Star: Populist 
Warrior or Reckless Foe of Big Business, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 2006, at Metropolitan Desk 35 
(describing how Eliot Spitzer used the Martin Act to force large Wall Street firms such as Merrill 
Lynch to disclose conflicts of interest). 
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905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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for deeming the action contrary to the public interest or the protection of 
investors.  
The logic of this proposal is that the SEC is politically accountable and 
should remain so. Were the SEC to take action invalidating a rule or settlement 
reached by state regulators, it would be subject to political attack and criticism – 
and properly so. State attorneys general are adept, possibly more adept than the 
SEC, at mobilizing public opinion, and the press would predictably focus on the 
case. As a result, Congressional oversight of the SEC’s actions would be highly 
likely. 
More importantly, under this provision, the SEC could not place some 
topic or issue wholly off limits to state regulators, in effect preempting state 
regulation. This broader preemption is what the Blueprint proposes and what we 
have earlier criticized. Under our proposal, the SEC could preempt only specific 
rules, regulations, or settlements – and only with a full public explanation from 
the SEC as to why the action invalidated was contrary to the public interest or the 
protection of investors. We submit that the SEC would use this power only 
sparingly and that such an ex post power responds adequately to the danger that a 
single state might take action on its own that adversely impacted competition or 
the national market system. 
CONCLUSION 
What should we learn from this crisis? 
First, financial institutions are fragile. Because they rely on short-term 
liabilities to finance their holding of longer-term illiquid assets, they are 
inherently likely to face liquidity crises in times of market stress. 
Second, the incentives for financial institutions to seek to increase 
leverage in order to enhance profitability are strong. This cycle is likely to repeat 
itself, at least so long as financial managers remain incentivized to accept high 
risk and “to keep dancing as long as the music is playing.”242 
Third, in a bubbly market, it is easy to rationalize economizing on due 
diligence and professional standards. But the long-term costs are high. 
Fourth, simple rules typically work better than complex ones. Although a 
prophylactic rule that places a ceiling on leverage (as the SEC’s standard net 
capital rule did) has its costs, it is capable of effective implementation, while a 
more optimal rule (in terms of its theoretical design) may be beyond the effective 
capacity of many bureaucracies to implement. 
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Against this backdrop, we believe that the Blueprint’s proposal to confine 
the U.S. securities regulator to the promulgation of broad principles and leave it to 
the SROs to issue specific rules implementing those principles, while also 
preempting state enforcers, is precisely the wrong prescription. At most, we 
propose the SEC be given a more limited ex post power to restrain state 
regulators, but not to preempt them. 
All this said, the Blueprint still makes an important contribution in calling 
for the consolidation of financial regulators and by favoring the “twin peaks” 
model of separating the consumer protection regulator from the “prudential” or 
“safety and soundness” regulator. To limit excessive leverage and risky trading 
practices, one must give a greater role to the prudential regulator. Precisely 
because “prudential” regulation of leverage and risk requires the regulator to go 
beyond disclosure and reach paternalistic judgments about what level of risk is 
unsound, we doubt that the SEC is ideally suited to play this role. Neither its 
culture nor its expertise incline it to go beyond its normal mandate of ensuring full 
disclosure. It contrast, banking regulators can consider all major financial 
institutions, including investment banks, from a common perspective and apply a 
common standard. At such a task, we believe the Federal Reserve or similar 
agency has the comparative advantage, is less exposed to capture, and can 
outperform the SEC. 
Important as the issues we have discussed are, we must close with the 
nagging sense that they will still be the subject of debate when the Virginia Law 
Review in due course convenes its “100th Anniversary of the SEC Symposium.” 
Law reform is a marathon, not a sprint. 
